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ABSTRACT 
This study examines Islam, tuan guru (Islamic scholars) and politics in the 2005 
gubernatorial election (pilkada) in South Kalimantan. During the pilkada, Islam and 
politics were closely intertwined. The candidates exhibited their Islamic attributes 
and courted Islamic leaders and institutions. On the other hand, tuan guru joined the 
campaigns of particular candidates, religious events become political forums to 
~ - ~ · -.....-------..._~·--
promote candidates, and campaign functions featured religious activities. 
The common view of this pilkada emphasised influence of Islamic appeals in shaping 
~ ·-------·-··- ·- v-... cle..r 
the electoral outcome. The skilful use of Islamic symbols was seen as the key factor 
---- -.....___ __ _ 
in explaining the success of the winning candidates. Other factors, such as party 
machinery and networks, public image, political finance and campaign time, while 
contributed, were seen as secondary. 
This sub-thesis demonstrates that, while Islam was important, it was not the sole 
critical factor; it was, in fact, contingent on other factors mentioned above to 
determine the pilkada results. I argue that Islamic appeals were of limited help for 
those candidates with bad reputations and I show that the pilkada victors combined 
------
high public standing, effective political machines and good campaign funding and 
timing. Furthermore, this study finds that tuan guru were not crucial players in the 
election outcome. 
This study also considers the larger trend of local elections in Indonesia and looks at 
the coalitions which nominated the candidates and at the motivations of tuan guru to 
be involved in the pilkada. It argues that both pragmatic and ideological or idealistic 
considerations existed and thus, the pilkada projected a more complex picture than 
what other local elections have generally shown. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2005 gubernatorial pilkada (pemilihan kepala daerah , regional head elections or 
~
local elections) was an extraordinary time for Islam and politics in South Kalimantan. 
The relationship between politicians and ulama (ulema; generically referred to as 
tuan guru in South Kalimantan) intensified markedly during the campaign. It blurred 
the line between Islam and politics and tested the ability of the ulama to shape 
political outcomes. 
This sub-thesis is a study of the pilkada and the relationship bet';"'een Islam and 
politics in it. The pilkada was one of hundreds of local elections which have been 
held .across Indonesia to directly elect regional heads (governors, regents and mayors) 
j ..... ~ 
since 2005, a political process seen as crucial to consolidating Indonesia's 
democracy. On the other hand, Islam and politics have traditionally been interlinked 
in South K~limantan as reflected in the strong support for political Islam and the 
importance of Islamic sentiments in politics in the region. Thus this study touches 
upon both current and older but still persistent issues regarding Islam and politics. 
0 
k<>.1 ~ o......J · ~ Study objective and literature review 
The objective of this sub-thesis is to scrutinize the role of Islam and ulama in the 
South Kalimantan pilkada and the extent to which these factors influenced the 
results. The sub-thesis also relates the trend found in the other local elections to the 
pilkada. 
Political trends in Indonesian local elections 
The trend that concerns this study most is what the observers have identified as the 
absence of ideological predilections and the supremacy of pragmatic considerations 
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/;~~~ :~;:e:1:::w~:~~;:h;h::e:::e:v:e~t~:~:ea:~ i~::::: n",building and !lie ~g of candidate" I shall review their arguments 
hierhe"" \ f I·. 'd / 1. · 2006 M G'bb · d h · 1 1 
n is assessment o n ones1an po itlcs m , c i on pomte out t at m oca 
--·elections, politic.al partie~,)t~nded to ignore ideology in building the coalitions that 
nominated the candid~(~ 'Quoting research by the People 's Voter Education 
\. I 
Network (JPPR), he notealnat this was a pervasive practice as broad based coalitions 
that included nationalist and Islamic parties were forged in most local elections. 
While winning the majority of pilkada, he continued, the coalitions often produced 
'strange ideological bedfellows ' as parties with a history of bitter competition/ / 
teamed up and as an Islamist party joined forces with a Christian party.2 The local 
I 
elections thus showed a strong tendency towards what he labeled 'ideological 
promiscuity'. 
According to McGibbon, this tendency of the teaming up of parties across ideologies 
came about primarily in an attempt to broaden their appeal. Parties with conservative 
religious platforms, he explained, have not performed well electorally since free and 
fair elections were introduced in 1999. In effect, the parties preferred to eschew 
exclusive and narrow religious issues and to build pragmatic alliances with other 
parties in local elections. 
In a similar line of argumentation, Baswedan, who assessed the state of Indonesian 
politics in the following year (2007), confirmed the domination of political 
pragmatism at the local level. The local elections in fact, he argued, broke down the 
persistence of ideological polarization in national politics in which the reallocation of 
votes occurred within a group of parties in a similar political stream (i.e. secular or 
1 Rodd McGibbon, ' Indonesian Politics in 2006: stability, compromise and contest over ideology', 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. No. 42, vol. 3, 2006, pp. 331-2. 
2 Ibid 
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Islamic). 3 He asserted that the coalitions emerging in local elections would have 
been 'unthinkable ' at the national level. 4 He cited the example of the alliance of the 
nationalist PDI-P (Partai Demokasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic 
Party of Struggle) and PKS (Partai KeadilanSejahtera, Justice and Prosperity Party) 
in nine district/ municipal pilkada. 
The importance of pragmatism was also evident in the choosing of nominees. Parties, 
Baswedan noted, tended to endorse those with a high potential of electoral success 
even if they are not party members. On the other hand, they were also willing to 
support even underdog candidates if they had no suitable candidate because the 
chance of getting 'nomination fees' disappears if the parties do not participate in 
pilkada. 5 Conversely, the aspiring candidates needed to negotiate with eligible 
political parties regardless of their ideological preferences. 
In short, local elections, according to these observers, have shown the diminishing 
importance of ideological preference and the domination of political pragmatism. The 
question is then, did the pilkada in South Kalimantan demonstrate the same trend of 
pragmatism over ideology, and if not, how did it differ from other regions? 
Islam as an electoral strategy and its influence on voting behaviour 
A report by Asrari Kami (2006) entitled 'Belantara Simbol Agama' (The Jungle of 
Religious Symbols) was perhaps the first work that discussed Islam in relation to the 
political outcomes in the South Kalimantan pilkada . This article appeared in the 
national weekly magazine Gatra and relied on groups of people who watched the 
pilkada closely as sources, such as the province's electoral commission (KPU) 
3 Anies Baswedan, 'Indonesian Politics in 2007: the presidency, local elections and the future of 
democracy', Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, No. 43, vol. 3, p. 336 
4 Ibid 
5 Eligible candidates have to be nominated by a party or a coalition of parties that won at least 15% of 
the seats or of the votes in legislative elections in the area in question. This stipulation increases the 
bargaining power of parties in the pilkada. Thus candidates need to negotiate with the parties and the 
issue of how much money they are prepared to pay for the candidacy typically arises. See Marcus 
Mietzner, 'Local democracy, Old elites are still in power, but direct elections now give voters a 
choice' , Inside Indonesia, Jan-March htrn:/L>\\Y\V.)t.:l5ifl.:O.iD.~ism':':'?li!,flf,g!qmrgnt/y((<.'>YJLQ!?2i. (viewed 12 
October 2007) 
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members, the province's coordinator of JPPR, NGO activists and political 
commentators. The article brought together their views about the main features 
characterizing the South Kalimantan local elections in 2005 . It was thus arguably a 
work that represented the local observers' perspective. It is instructive to review the 
main argument of this article as it touches on the core objective of this sub-thesis, 
namely the role oflslam in the pilkada. 
The article argued that Islamic symbols or more precisely, Islamic appeals were the 
key in the electoral successes of the candidates. Setting out this argument, the 
opening paragraph reads, 
There is no need to have a highly sophisticated vision and mission to be elected as political 
leader in South Kalimantan. A skilful play oflslamic symbols and sentiments will do 
it . . . There are many ways of doing this. It could be by claiming to be the adopted son of a 
charismatic kiai[Islamic scholars who usually lead Islamic learning institutions], by declaring 
oneself a descendant of a great ulama (it would be better if [one] could claim to be a 
descendant of the Prophet), by consistently wearing baju koko or kupiah putih [respectively, 
collar-less loose shirts, usually white and white skullcaps] (my translation). 6 
All the examples of playing with Islamic sentiments mentioned in the paragraph were 
in reference to three winners and one team that achieved an electoral surprise in 
2005. They were Rudy Ariffin (the adopted son of Guru Zaini), the victor of the 
gubernatorial pilkada; Yudhi Wahyuni (a descendant of the famous Syeikh 
Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari), the winner of the mayoral pilkada in Banjarmasin; 
Gusti Khairul Saleh (baju koko ), who won the Banjar district pilkada; and Habib 
····· - -
Aboe Bakar al-Habsyi (a prophet's descendant wearing a kupiah putih), a deputy 
gubernatorial candidate whose team was placed second behind Rudy Ariffin's team. 
The article strongly emphasized the correlations between the use of Islamic 
sentiments and political victory in the pilkada(s) . It did mention in passing that 
effective party machines and networks also contributed to the victory of Rudy and 
Yudhi. However, its overall tone and line of argumentation were clearly favoring 
Islamic symbols over the other factors to explain the local election outcomes. Thus, it 
6 The article is reprinted in Asrori Kami, 'Belantara Simbol Agama', in Asrori Kami (ed.), Hajatan 
Demokrasi, potret jurnalistik pemilu lansung simpul Islam Indonesia, dari moderat hingga garis 
keras, (Jakarta, Gatra-PT Era Media Informasi, 2006), pp. 347-362 
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contended that Islamic appeals played a determinant role m shaping the pilkada 
results. 
This sub-thesis will examine the above argument by reassessing the pilkada results 
and analyzing the range of strategies applied by the gubernatorial candidates in their 
election campaigns. In tum, it seeks to offer an analysis of how, and the extent to 
which, Islam influenced the outcomes of the pilkada. 
Ulama in local elections. 
As part of studying the role of Islam in the pilkada, this sub-thesis closely looks at 
the involvement of tuan guru (local Islamic scholars). Two aspects of the 
involvement are of inportance: the role that tuan guru played, and their motivations. I 
shall discuss academic works on ulama and local elections outside South Kalimantan, 
as this is the first study of this kind on the province so far. 
One early observation on local elections in Indonesia suggests that Islamic leaders 
acted as assistants to the candidates. Ben Hilman (2006) who wrote one of the first 
English articles on direct regional head elections noted, "Leaders from Muslim, 
student and other activist organizations are useful assistants because they can 
mobilize supporters at rallies and during campaigns."7 In other words, ulama were 
involved in the politics of pilkada but not as political leaders. 
1;1 
However, against this, in some areas ulama run as candidates competing for local 
; 
executive offices . In 2005, Kebumen district in Central Java had two kiais, 
Nashiruddin al Masyur and Imam Muzani Bunyamin, as deputy regent candidates. 8 
In the same year, Tuan Guru Hatim Salman was elected deputy regent in Banjar 
7 Ben Hillman, 'New Election, Old Politics', Far Eastern Economic Review, Jan/Feb 2006; 169, 1, p. 
28. (The italics are mine) 
8 Nashiruddin is a sufi order (tare/cat) kiai and the head of Pesantren at-Taqwa, Kutosari . He won the 
pilkada as the running mate of Rustriningsih, a female politician. Imam Muzani is the head of 
Pesantren Darussa'adah, Petanahan and the ulama leader of Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) branch 
in Kebumen. Sidik Jatmika, Kiai dan Politik Lokal, Studi Kasus Reposisi Politik Kiai NU Kebumen, 
Jawa Tengah Memanfaatkan Peluang Keterbukaan Partisipasi di Era Reformasi, Doctoral Thesis, 
Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 2005, p. l. 
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district, South Kalimantan (KPUD Kalsel 2005). In 2008, Kiai Ali Maschan Musa 
ran as a deputy candidate in the East Java gubernatorial pilkada, but was defeated in 
its first round. 9 In the same year, Tuan Guru 'Bajang' Muhammad Zainul Majdi won 
the gubernatorial pilkada in Nusa Tenggara Barat. 10 The most notable case would be 
the 2005 district head election in Sumenep, Madura in which each of the five teams 
of candidates contained kiai. 11 
With the reference to the pilkada in Sumenep in 2000 and 2005, Gaffar Karim (2008) 
argues that kiai controlled the political recruitment process. He demonstrates that 
since 1998, kiai and pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) in Sumenep have been 'the 
major playmakers' and effectively, controlled political recruitment. They were the 
ones who made important decisions about which candidate to support in the process, 
leaving political parties in a passive position. 12 
Moreover, I also question the motivation of tuan guru who become involved in the 
pilkada. In the absence of any such research on South Kalimantan, I will tum to 
studies on Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest traditionalist Muslim organisation in 
Indonesia. NU is relevant for this sub-thesis for three reasons. First, the organisation 
is led by ulama and thus there is an opportunity to find some answers to the question 
about motivation. Second, South Kalimantan is traditionally an outer Island 
stronghold of NU. 13 Finally, all tuan guru interviewed for this study are Nahdliyyin 
(NU people). 
9 
' Peserta Pilkada Jatim Kampanye Perdana', Liputan 6.com, 
"~"LcLUillillli'l&Ql.D:'.!15'.:Y:c'i:.LL\El..\H.0~'l~\2..J'~ (viewed 19 February 2009); 'LSI: Kaji dan 
Karsa ke Putaran Kedua', Kompas, 
(viewed 
19 February 2009). A~~ used to be the executive chairman (Ketua Tanfidziyyah) of the East 
Java branch (provinc\al branch??):gfNahdlatul Ulama prior to the gubernatorial pilkada. 
10 
'TGB M Zainul Majdi-Mmi.etmrrgR:an Pilgub NTB' (viewed 
19 February 2009). Zainul Majdi is the head of Nahdlatul Wathan (NW) of Pancor, NTB[ spell out]. 
NW is the largest Muslim organization in NTB that split up into Pancor and Anjani NWs after the 
death of its founder, Tuan Guru Zainuddin Abdul Majid. 
11 Abdul Gaffar Karim, 'Pesantren in Power: religious institutions and Political recruitment m 
Sumenep, Madura', Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, v.42, no. l , 2008, pp. 179. 
12 !bid., p. 180 
13 Just nine years after its establishment, Nahdlatul Ulama held its Muktamar (Congress) m 
Banjarmasin, the municipality of this province, in 1935. In the first general elections in 1955, NU was 
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In his study of NU's high age of politics (1952-1967), Fealy (1998) argued that 
religious principles informed NU's political decisions. He mentioned four main 
principles: maslahat (pursuit of benefit) and mafsadah (avoidance of harm), amar 
ma 'ruf nahi munkar (enacting good and preventing evil) and akhajfud-dararain 
(choosing the lesser of two evils). 14 He asserted that NU's application of these 
principles was manifest throughout the period of his study, the 1950s and 1960s. For 
the purpose of my study, Fealy's work demonstrates that religious considerations can 
be one explanation for the political involvement of ulama. 
Economic benefits could also motivate the involvement of ulama. In the 
aforementioned article on pesantren and kiai in Madura (the overwhelming majority 
of whom are nahdliyyin ), Gaffar Karim notes that 
"It is very common for politicians and government officials to maintain regular visits to 
pesantren for political purposes (particularly prior to general elections), during which they 
also give some financial support, or promise to give some in return for the pesantren's 
political support". 15 
Politicians and government officials then become one of the financial sources for kiai 
to maintain and develop their pesantren. This, Gaffar Karim argues, is one of the 
reasons why the majority of kiai in Sumenep are politically active. 
And indeed, donations and patronage can drive a kiai to take a controversial political 
decision. In the 1973, Kiai Musta'in Romly of Jombang, East Java, who led 
Pesantren Darul Ulum and a Sufi order (tarekat Qadiriyyah wa Naqsyabandiyah) 
joined Golkar when the other kiais all supported NU. Endang Turmudi (1996) 
explained that it was inconceivable and unacceptable at the time for a traditionalist 
kiai in Jombang to support other parties, especially Golkar which was hostile to 
the victor in South Kalimantan. The long term serving chairman of this organisation (1956-1982), Kiai 
Idham Chalid is a Banjarese of South Kalimantan. More about Idham see Ahmad Muhajir, Idham 
Chalid, guru politik orang NU (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pesantren, 2007) and Arief Mudatsir Mandan 
(ed.), Napak Tilas Pengabdian Idham Chalid, tanggung jawab politik NU dalam Sejarah (Jakarta: 
Pustaka Indonesia Satu, 2008) 
14 Greg Fealy, Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: a History of Nahdlatul Ulama, 1952-1967, Doctoral 
Thesis, Monash University, 1998, p. 272 
15 Abdul Gaffar Karim, 'Pesantren in Power, p. 164 
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NU. 16 According to Martin van Bruinessen, in 1963, Kiai Musta'in received 
generous donations for his plan to erect a university in Jombang from politicians and 
military leaders in Jakarta with whom he cultivated relationships. 17 Van Bruinessen 
also relates how during the transition to the New Order in the late 1960s, Kiai 
Musta'in maintained his close contacts with the political rulers in Jakarta, then was 
slowly dragged towards Golkar until, finally, he joined it in 1973. 18 Golkar, the New 
Order regime's party, needed political support from the Muslim community and Kiai 
Musta'in provided it. I believe the patronage and the flow of donations from the 
regime were important in his joining Golkar. 19 
In this sub-thesis, I will evaluate whether tuan guru merely supported the candidates, 
or competed over the office, or indeed, became the political playmakers. I will also 
examine the influence of religious or idealistic considerations and material benefits in 
motivating the tuan guru who were involved in the pilkada . 
Background Information 
The gubernatorial pilkada and the candidates 
Held on 30 June 2005 , the pilkada was one of the first direct local elections in 
Indonesia. It ran smoothly, on schedule, was completed in one round only, and there 
was no violence between supporters of the candidates. Apart from the battle of claim 
and counter claim of the candidates in local newspapers about who supported whom 
(discussed in chapte~ three), there was few burning controverie~exc~:,t~~~s tQ .... -~ 
that were first, the dispute between the electoral comm1ss10n d the Panwas 
Pilkada, the committee that oversees the holding of the pilkada, over the 
16 Endang Turmudi, Struggling for the Umma: changing leadership roles of kiai in Jombang, East 
Java, Ph. D thesis, Australian National University, Canberra, 1996, pp. 90-2 
17 Martin van Bruinessen, N U: Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa dan Pencarian Wacana Baru 
(Y ogyakarta: LKiS , 1994), p. 172. 
18 Ibid. 
19 In effect, I do not find the interpretation offered by Endang Turmudi about Kiai Musta'in ' s joining 
Golkar as the search for a 'new field' (ladang barn) of the Islamic struggle, convincing. See his 
interpretation in Endang Turmudi, Struggling for the Umma, pp. 92-6. 
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interpretation of when the campaign officially started. 20 This resulted only in the 
forced removal of around 136 candidates' electoral materials, such as hoardings and 
street banners, by the Panwas prior to the period of official campaign. 21 There was no 
resistance from the candidates on this. Second, a complaint over the pilkada results 
was filed by the team who finished third, Gusti Iskandar and Hafiz Anshary, but was 
then withdrawn just two days later. 22 In most cases, disputes were solved peacefully 
and reasonably quickly. Voter turnout reached 67%,23 but as was the case in other 
areas, the practice of vote buying was said to be widespread although this was not 
proven legally. 24 In most respects, the South Kalimantan gubernatorial pilkada 
typified Indonesia's respectable record in holding direct regional head elections. 
Five teams competed in the pilkada, with candidates for governor and deputy 
governor consisting of five career bureaucrats, three party politicians, one 
( 
businessperson and one academic. 25 This means that there were more independent 
candidates than party cadres seeking nomination. This also indicates a better 
bargaining position of tlre~ vis-a-vis the ? andidates. Furthermore, m~ the 
bureaucrats and the politicians were entrepre, eurs as well, and had ties with a local 
coal-mining tycoon or a local logging ma . ate who had vested interests in their 
victories. 26 This explains the ability of c : ndidates to fund their nomination and 
campaign. Moreover, 20 political parties n minated the candidates, 13 of which had 
no seat in the local assembly (DPRD) bu their accumulated votes in the legislative ~J2~e~ 
0" J 'h1"1 --------A A().... . ._v 
\"I- y.-""' 20 Mohammad Effendy, Potret Pemilihan Guber r dan Wald/ Gubernur Kalimantan Selatan, Upaya 
V-r) MembangunDemokrasiLokal, (Banjarmasin: PT rafika Wangi Kalimantan, 2006), pp. 149-160 
2 1 
' 136 Atribut Pilkada Ditertibkan', Radar Banj rmasin, 2 June 2005 
22
' Iskandar-Hafiz Ajukan Keberatan', Banjarmas ·n Post, 18 July 2005. Apparently, the complaint was 
to slow down the installment of the governor elect, as the last political 'bullet' of the defeated 
candidates. The complainants finished third pla e, over 159 thousand votes behind the winner. The 
chance to change the pilkada results was thus im. The complainants certainly understood this and 
lobbying between elite politicians quickly te inated this complaint. See 'Iskandar-Hafiz Cabut 
Gugatan, Radar Banjarmasin, 20 July 2005 . 
23 KPUD Kalsel, Tingkat Partisipasi Gubernu Kalsel 2005, as cited in Asrari Kami, 'Belantara 
Simbol Agama ', p. 360 
24 
'Tim Sukses Adukan Money Politics' , Banja wsin Post, 3 July 2005; Interview with Ilyas, the 
former PPP parliamentarian in Hulu Sungai Utar district, Amuntai, 2 June 2008; Marcus Mietzner, 
Local Election Briefing: South Kalimantan, 2005, published paper. 
25 See the pamphlet of So\!,th Kalimantan KPU and ohammad Effendy, Potret Pemilihan Gubernur, 
pp. 39-50 
26 Marcus Mie zner, Ibid. ~ "fie Dtf ~ 1 k_ 
he. t~ " Page 9 
(l'1/~&L.. 
-u,k~ r~L\ 
cv....J ,- JJ\ 
~ 
~~J 





elections were enough to provide a ticket. Golkar was the only party that could 
nominate candidates by itself, and the remaining six parties formed three coalitions. 
Two of the four coalitions combined secular and Islamic parties, and the other two 
coalitions were between Islamic parties only, indicating that both ideological 
promiscuity and ideological preferences existed in the pilkada. The pamphlet below 
was distributed by the South Kalimantan KPU and it contained photos and personal 
information about the candidates and their nominating parties. 
PASANGAN CALON GUBERNUR 
DAN WAKIL GUBERNUR 
PAOA PEMILIHAN KEPALA DAERAH DAN WAKIL KEPALA DAERAH 
PROPINSI KALIMANTAN SELATAN 
Kamis, 30 Juni 
at '' 2005 1110 PEMIL;HAN GUBERNUR 





The total votes of the candidates in the 2005 gubernatorial pilkada 
No. Candidates Total Votes Percentage 
1. H. Gusti Iskandar and Prof. Dr. H. A. Hafiz A. AZ, MA 310,216 21.39 
2. H. M. Sjachriel Darham and Drs. H. Noor Aidi , MM, Msi 178,695 12.32 
3. H. M. Ramlan, S. Sos and Drs. H. Baderani 87,172 6.01 
4 Drs. ll Rudy Ariffin. iVL\.1 and H. M. Rosehm1 NB. SH*) 469.362 32.36 
5. Prof. Dr. Ir. H. Ismet A., MSc and Habib Aboe Bakar 404,880 27.92 
Source: South Kalimantan KPU 
*) the winning team 
Islam in South Kalimantan 
Islam is professed by the overwhelming majority (97%) of South Kalimantan's 
population (2000 census). 27 This numerical significance is accompanied by 
demonstrations ofreligious piety, as indicated by the presence of mosques or langgar 
(a prayer house that does not hold the communal Friday prayers) in virtually every 
village, and by the importance of the hajj pilgrimage in the region. 28 It is thus not an 
exaggeration that the Banjarese, the native ethnic group of the province, as noted by 
Chalmers (2008), have a reputation within Indonesia of being observant Muslims. 
··--..... 
Moreover, Islam is, Hawki s (2000) 1obs~ves, "of importance in Banjar life" and "at 
the heart of Banjar concep · n o the<r'own identities". 29 Indeed, Islamic teachings 
,r· 
"have now become an int.ygral part of the norms and social life of the Banjarese", 
27 As cited in Leo Suryadinata, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Aris Ananta, Indonesia's Population, 
Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape (Singapore: !SEAS, 2003), table 4.2.2, p. 
110 
28 By the L9'h century, Banjarmasin, the capital of South Kalimantan, which has long been a major port 
of embarkation for hajj pilgrims, had the largest number of pilgrims in the Indies (Soeroto 1976, p. 
173, fn .!18). In the early decades of the 20'h century, about 10,000 people left for the holy land every 
year g~<ring South Kalimantan 'the highest proportions of hajis in the entire Musim world" (Lindblad 
& Ve!]hagen 1988, p. 70). In the present day, the province sends the third largest number of pilgrims 
every year (Hawkins 2000, p. 35, fn. 4). All information here was compiled by Ian Chalmer, 'The 
Islaiii\ sation of Southern Kalimantan: Sufi Spiritualism, Ethnic Identity, Political Activism ', Studia 
{JsiamiJka - Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 371-417. 
~ry Hawkins, 'Becoming Ban jar' , The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, 1: 1, 2000, pp. 30, 32 
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concluded Alfani Daud (1997), 30 an anthropologist who observed the communities of 
South Kalimantan for decades. . ,.)_ 
~ 
As in Indonesian Isla~ere are traditionalist and modernist Muslims in South 
Kalimantan, commonly~rred to as the kaum tua (old guard) and the kaum muda 
(young guard) respectively. Although we do not have any estimation of each group, it 
is widely believed that the traditionalists outnumber the modernists significantly. In 
the 1955 election for instance, the traditionalist NU received a 16 percent bigger 
share of votes than the modernist Masjumi. This made South Kalimantan an outer 
Island base ofNU. 31 
Islam has also had political impacts in the province as it has provided a basis for 
various rebellions against the state. The armed rebellion in 1859 against the Dutch in 
I 
Banjarmasin was said to be inspired by a spirit of jihad Ji sabilillah (the holy war 
against the infidels) and drew support from the members of a local popular Sufi 
brotherhood, the Beratip Beamal. 32 In the early 1950s, a group of guerillas led by 
30 Alfani Daud, Islam dan Masyarakat Banjar: deskripsi dan analisis kebudayaan Banjar (Jakarta, 
Rajawali Press, 1997), p. 189 
31 This also means that South Kalimantan Muslims experienced bitter rivalry and conflicts among 
them in both doctrinal and political matters. The kaum muda denounced practices which the 
traditionalists believed to be part of Banjarese religious life, such as the common death rites and the 
veneration of saints, as heretic. Tensions mounted as the kaum tua defended their traditions, leading to 
conflicts and to establishing separate prayer houses. Saifuddin, who wrote an important study on the 
tension between the Kaum Tua and Kaum Muda in Alabio, a large town in upriver South Kalimantan, 
notes that in 1931 and 1940 armed conflict almost broke as the kaum tua people tried to prevent 
modernist preachers from delivering Friday sermons. The establishment of mass organizations 
representing each group, Sarekat Islam and Musyawaratuttalibin first, and then Muhammadiyah and 
Nahdlatul Ulama later, added politics to the already sharp doctrinal conflict. According to Saifuddin, 
the local branch of Sarekat Islam in Alabio was established in the 1920s, but then its importance 
waned in 1930s. A Muhammadiyah local branch was opened in 1930 or around five years after the 
ulama of kaum muda returned from Saudi Arabia and started their reformist movement in Alabio. 
Musyawaratuttalibin, on the other hand, was the organization for kaum tua established in 1931 and 
later in 1950s it was dissolved into Nahdlatul Ulama. Achmad Fediyani Saifuddin, Konjlik dan 
Integrasi, perbedaanfaham keagamaan dalam agama Islam (Jakarta: Rajawali, 1986), pp. pp. 30, 37, 
41-2, 58. Outside local parliament, the traditional sites of competition between modernists and 
traditionalists are the local branch of the religious affairs departments, the State Islamic Institute 
(IAIN), and mosques that receive government subsidies. 
32 Soeri Soeroto, 'The Beratip Beamal movement in the Banjar War', in Sartono Kartodirdjo (ed.), 
Profiles of Malay Culture, Historiography, Religion and Politics (Jakarta: Ministry of Education and 
Culture, 1976), pp. 167-77 and Helius Sjamsuddin, 'Islam and resistance in Central and South 
Kalimantan in the ninetieth and early twentieth centuries', in Merle C. Ricklefs (ed.), Islam in the 
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Ibnu Hajar joined Kartosuwirjo's Darul Islam revolt that declared the establishment 
of an Indonesian Islamic state (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII) in 1948. This time the 
revolt was directed against the republic of Indonesia. 
The majority of Muslims in the province, however, chose to support political Islam in 
its struggle within the republic's political system. They have shown strong support 
for Islamic parties, although in the New Order period,when the electoral system was 
I 
tightly controllel Golkar was dominant. In the 1955 general elections, 633,170 voters 
gave NU and Nfasjumi, two major Islamic parties representing traditionalist and 
modernist Muslims respectively, an overwhelming 80.5 percent of the total votes.33 
In the second general elections of the New Order in 1977, South Kalimantan voters 
gave PPP, an amalgamation of four Islamic parties including NU, 49 percent votes, 
the biggest that it secured across Indonesia. 34 This was for the first and the only time 
( 
that Golkar lost its electoral domination in the province throughout the New Order 
period. Islamic parties could again place their hopes on the voters in the post Suharto 
elections, as they received 49 percent of the total vote in 1999 and 54 percent in 2004 
(KPUD Kalsel 1999 and 2004). 
Tuan guru 
Tuan guru ,_,a=lamic knowledge wh~on e.y . 
religious matters. They are learned in the holy texts and usually have performed the 
- . 
hajj pilgrimage. Given the importance of religion in Banjarese life, as noted above, 
they achieve social prominence. People treat them reverentially more than ordinary 
members of a given community. In addition to their main functions of teaching and to 
leading rituals, they play an advisory role. People come to them with marriage 
problems, life issues and, sometimes, political choices. Their presence often shames 
Indonesian Social Context, (Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 
1991), pp. 7-17 
33 Alfian, Hasil Pemilihan Umum 1955 untuk Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat (Jakarta: Lembaga Ekonomi 
dan Kemasjarakatan Nasional, 1974), p. 26 
34 Pemilu Indonesia dalam Angka dan Fakta Tahun 1955-1999 (Jakarta: Biro Humas Komisi 
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those who do things prohibited by religion such as drinking alcohol, gambling or 
eating in the day during the fasting month. This means that they are seen as moral 
guardians of the community. Most of them remain aloof from mundane activities, 
such as sports and entertainment to maintain their elevated status. 
There are two learning institutions that tuan guru lead, namely pesantreii:--and 
first are boarding schools where pupils study Islamic tenets and 
c nnes, progressing from level to level, and the second is a forum for religious 
sermons, usually for a broader audience and does not have a tied or specific 
curriculum. It is true that not all tuan guru have pesantren or pengajian, but certainly 
those who lead one or both institutions are more influential. Attendance at their 
institutions reflects their popularity as well as their influence. 
I 
Some tuan guru are political by either cultivating relationships with politicians or 
taking up positions in political parties. As discussed above, politicians and 
government can be generous donors. Tuan guru's power is their influence over the 
pupils and followers. As tuan guru have their own public forum where they can say 
many things or even mobilize people, politicians and public officials face both 
challenges and opportunities. It is to their advantage if tuan guru applaud their works 
and policies, but conversely, it is a problem if tuan guru criticize them. In a way, this 
suggests that tuan guru have more power than politicians. However, as the 
authoritarian New Order has demonstrated, politicians can be harsh to ulama. They 
were capable of intimidating ulama and cutting off patronage that sustained ulama 
and their followers. Thus the bargaining power of tuan guru with politicians is very 
much dependant on the circumstances. Generally, however, their relations are of 
benefit to both sides and, importantly, not necessaril~negativc 
Primary sources and sub-thesis structure 
This study relies on two types of information, namely documentary evidence and 
interview materials. The main source of documentary evidence for the pilk@ ted 
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I 
events is three local newspapers, Banjarmasin Post, Radar Banjarmasin and 
Kalimantan Post. The reports from January to July 2005 are essential, but I pay 
particular attention to the reports in June, the month of the pilkada . In addition, the 
South Kalimantan KPU produced two books about the process and the results of the 
pilkada. Finally, the few papers on the South Kalimantan pilkada by political 
observers are also a primary source of documentary evidence. 
Oral evidence was gathered in interviews carried out in five districts of South 
Kalimantan between May and June 2008. Over thirty interviews were conducted with 
various informants, including ten tuan guru, eight local politicians and a few 
observers. The interviews are particularly important for the issue of tuan guru's 
political motivation which were not discussed in the media reports. Furthermore, the 
tuan guru and politician informants were the supporters of four different teams in the 
pilkada, from which diverse, sometimes conflicting, information was obtained. 
The sub-thesis is structured according to topics. In chapter two, I examine the role of 
Islam in the pilkada . By showing that all candidates used Islamic appeals in their 
electoral strategies, I argue that Islam was 'contingent' on other factors, not 
'determinant', in shaping the pilkada outcomes as previously perceived by South 
Kalimantan observers. Chapter three discusses the motivations of tuan guru who 
were involved in the pilkada. I demonstrate that there were two groups of tuan guru: 
those who were motivated by pragmatic reasons and those who were driven by 
idealistic considerations. This shows that the South Kalimantan pilkada exhibited a 
more complex picture than what observers have thought about local elections. In 
chapter four, I explore the activities of tuan guru as campaigners and the rewards that 
they received from the candidates who hired them. This is an attempt to reveal the 
political calculations of tuan guru and to see whether their institutions also benefited 
from their involvement in the pilkada. Finally, Chapter Five contains my 
conclusions. /.., , , fl ,\ l 
/ [v--cll> v, Lv. <J4u ~u ..,_,.,....e 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Islam in the 2005 Pilkada in South Kalimantan: 
Crucial but Contingent 
Introduction 
What can politicians do to attract Muslim voters who have traditionally supported 
I 
political Islam? What in particular, can they use to attract voters? "These questions 
...... ____ ----
occupied five pairs of candidates of the 2005 gubernatorial pilkada in South 
Kalimantan. The candidates know that Islam is demographically significant in the 
( 
province, and has been culturally and politically important. Ninety-seven percent of 
the population claim to profess Islam according to the 2000 census. For Banjarese, an 
ethnic group to which two third of the Muslim population belong, Islam is part of 
identity (Hawkins 2000, Chalmers 2008). In addition, the voters in this province have 
a strong allegiance to Islamic parties as pointed out in chapter one. Thus, the 
gubernatorial candidates had to come up with strategies informed by these realities. 
And they appear to have done so. 
The candidates incorporated Islam into their electoral strategies. First, they 
demonstrated their Islamic credentials. In the ballots, all candidates' names are 
prefixed with 'Haji', the title acquired after a Muslim observes the fifth pillar of 
Islam, pilgrimage to Mecca. Some of them further emphasised specific 'credentials' 
such as being close to charismatic ulama, being a descendant of the Prophet 
Muhammad (habib) or being a professor in a local Islamic institute. Second, they 
sought political support from ulama, locally called tuan guru, particularly those with 
lots of pupils and followers. Some tuan guru were even successfully recruited to join 
their campaign teams. In effect, the tuan guru gave campaign events an Islamic 
colour by reciting Qur' anic verses, giving Islamic lectures, delivering invocations 
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and reciting salawat (prayers of adoration to the Prophet Muhammad). Third, the 
candidates used religious occasions, such as pengajian (informal Islamic learning 
forums), Yasinan (a gathering in which recitation of the surah Qur'anic chapter Yasin 
is the main program), Maulid-an (the invocation of salawat and the life story of the 
Prophet), and common Salat Hajat (a prayer recommended for those in need) for 
political purposes. They used such occasions to introduce themselves and mobilise 
supporters. Finally, two candidates specifically promised to apply a regulation that 
I 
makes Islamic observance in bmadhan (fasting month) stricter. In short, Islamic 
appeals were pivotal in the wa candidates presented themselves and in the style of 
their campaigns. . J'i ii'"'"~ 1 _ 
WV..., 
This situation has led some local observers to conclude that Islamic sentiments were 
the key to explain the achievement of candidates the pilkada. 1 For instance, they 
ascribe the electoral achievement of the team that came second, Ismet Ahmad and 
Habib Aboe Bakar, to the fact that the candidate for deputy-governor is a habib (a 
descendant of the Prophet Muhammad) who wore a white cap. Habib are highly 
respected figures in South Kalimantan and thus, according to these observers, they 
have high electability. 2 In this respect, basically, they say if one wants to bolster his 
electioneering, one needs to bring in an Islamic charismatic figure to the team. 
Similarly, the observers attribute the victory of Rudy Ariffin mainly to his intimate 
relationship with the late Tuan Guru H. Muhammad Zaini whose pengajian attracted 
hundreds of thousands of people. They say that voters chose Rudy because he 
declared himself an adopted son of the tuan guru and because Rudy was perceived as 
someone who looked after him. 3 They believe that loyalty and sympathy towards 
Guru Zaini moved people to deliver the victory to Rudy. In other words, they c~ be j' 
that if the candidates are not prominent Islamic figures such as a habib, (lose to 
ulama could also lead to victory in a pilkada. The observers admit that other factors, 
such as effective campaigns and sufficient political finance, were at play. However, 
1 See this argument in Asrori Kami, 'Belantara Simbol Agama', in Asrori Kami (ed.), Hajatan 
Demokrasi, potret jurnalistik pemilu lansung simpul Islam Indonesia, dari moderat hingga garis 
keras, (Jakarta, Gatra-PT Era Media Informasi, 2006), pp. 347-362 
2 Mukhtar Sarman and Muhammad Ramly as quoted in Asrori Kami, Ibid., pp. 350-1 
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they imply that these factors come after or inferior to the Islamic factor. Islam, in 
their analysis, was the key to understanding the pilkada and more generally, the local 
politics. 
I would argue that the local observers overstate the role of Islam. I contend that Islam 
was contingent on the other factors mentioned above; that is, an effective campaign 
strategy and sufficient finance, andGo } ne further factor: a clean public image. While 
it was prominent during the campaign, Islam per se had limitations in determining 
the result of pilkada. In this chapter, I will point out these limitations and offer a 
more exact analysis of the role of Islam in tp~ .. r pilkada. This will be accomplished by 
n e. or{, ~~ \.) ""--..; (; "' v- p-, 
first showing that Islam is a standard $trategy that every candidate applied, and 
.....______._ 
second, by discussing case studies which examine the type of candidates Islam helps 
and does not help. 
,...----__ e~. 
Islamic appeals as a strategy employed by all candidates 
One important point that the local observers seem to ignore is the fact that every 
I candidate used Islam, not only the winners. This made Islamic symbols so prominent 
I during campaign. The analytical implications of this are that Islamic appeals cannot serve as the determinant factor for the pilkada results when everyone uses it. 
This becomes clear if we look at the role of Islam in the campaign strategies of the 
candidates. Let us first take the example of Sjachriel Darham, the incumbent 
governor competing for a second term. Of all the candidates, he had the advantage of 
being a well-known figure throughout the province. While others needed to introduce 
themselves first to the public, he could focus his time and energy on other aspects of 
his campaign. Moreover, as the serving governor, Sjachriel had the resources and 
opportunities to cultivate good relationships with. potential vote getters. During his 
term as governor, he frequently invited many tuan gu.ru to deliver invocations or to 
give Islamic lectures in government sponsored events or on private occasions. The 
tuan guru of course received good money as honoraria for their services. He also 
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I 
made generous donation to some pesantren notably Ibnul Amin of Pemangkih and 
al-~~rsyidul A~ien °/ Gambut. He handpicked tuan guru to fill the positions for a 
rehg10us estabhshmfnt funded by the government. He had the same authority in 
~ choosmg who wcillfd supervise the South Kalimantanese hajj candidates. Tuan guru 
who are appointed as supervisors get free hajj pilgrimage paid for out of the 
provincial budget, something seen as desirable by many. 
During his campaign, Sjachriel also applied strategies similar to those employed by 
the other candidates. One of them was to recruit tuan guru as campaigners. The 
recruited tuan guru were popular, with most of them holding regular pengajian 
attended by hundreds to thousands of people. Some of the tuan guru were heads of 
large pesantren which have thousands of students. Rudy Ariffin and the Ismet-Habib 
Aboe team put a heavy emphasis on this by inviting numerous tuan guru and habib to 
campaign events. Golkar-associated tuan guru attended the functiohs of the Iskandar-
Hafiz team, Golkar's nominees. In this respect, Sjachriel had Guru Ahmad Bakeri 
(more on him in chapter three) speaking in all his open campaign functions. 
Moreover, Sjachriel paid visits to several large pesantren and made donations. This 
was also done by the other candidates. Rudy Ariffin and his deputy governor 
candidate, Rosehan, in particular went to not only bigpesantren but also smaller ones 
and to numerous Islamic kindergartens (TK Al-Qur-an). 4 In each of these visit, they 
made donations. In some cases, candidates also visited the pesantren that their 
competitors had previously visited in order to be seen as being as generous and 
concerned about Islamic education as their competitors. 
In addition to visiting pesantren and vanous communities, Sjachriel made 
pilgrimages to the tombs of local holy people. One example of this took place in the 
tomb of Datu Kelampayan or Syeikh Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjary, as reported by a 
4 Interview with Rosehan NB, Banjarmasin, 2 May 2008; with Prof. Dr. Gazali, Banjar District, 30 
April and 9 June 2008; with Jamhuri, Banjannasin, 3 May 2008. '2R Kunjungi Pesantren-pesantren', 
Radar Banjamasin online, 1 February 2005. 
http://www.radarbanjannasin.com/berita/index.asp?berita=Utama&id=5l017 (viewed 20 April 2008) 
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local newspaper. 5 Syeikh Arsyad is perhaps the greatest ulama in the history of the 
Banjarese and more importantly, his tomb is the most popular destination of local 
pilgrimage in South Kalimantan. Sjachriel did not let the opportunity pass to take 
advantage of the symbolic value of Syeikh Arsyad' s tomb. 
T~ final campaign strategy using Islam employed by all candidates was performing o. ~· 
the common salat hajat. 6 This took place the night before election day with hundreds 
in attendance. Candidates invited their neighbours and sympathisers to pray for their 
success the following day. This ritual was led by tuan guru. From a political 
perspective, this event was a kind of mobilisation and show of power just like a 
campaign function. It was also allegedly a last minute chance for the 9andidates to 
distribute moneyr..to potential voters. It is a custom in South Kaliman~pkcially for 
better off peo6Jgive money, in envelopes, to the participants of common salat 
hajat to show their gratitude. During a campaign, this custom cou1d be manipulated 
for money politics practices. 7 
All these examples of using Islam for campaign purposes were employed by all 
candidates. Yet, only one pair of candidates won the pilkada, namely Rudy Ariffin 
and Rosehan NB. The central argument of the observers is that the key factor in the 
success of the candidates was because they played out Islamic sentiments. The 
victory of Rudy Ariffin and the achievement of the Ismet Ahmad-Habib Aboe team 
in finishing second, mentioned above, seemingly fit this analysis. Such an analysis 
however, cannot explain why other candidates who also employed Islamic symbols 
performed badly. Sjachriel, despite all his strategies to shore up Islamic support, 
bitterly finished second last, and Golkar' s nominees only achieved one level better 
than him, i.e. number three. Thus, if we accept the explanation that Islam is the key 
factor to explain the pilkada, we are left with a big hole in the analysis. 
5 
'Warga Kelampayan dan Kotabaru Sambut A' A', Kalimantan Post, 27 May 2005 
6 
'Sjahriel-Ramlan Gelar Salat Hajat, ungkapan rasa syukur dan permohonan doa', Radar 
Banjarmasin, 30 June 2005 
7 See for instance Banjarmasin Post, 3 and 5 June 2005 
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Islam works better for clean candidates 
Among other things, what the above discussion suggests is that Islam works better 
for some candidates than for others. An inqui: ~to the kind of candidates ~horn 
Islam helped most or did not help would gi-Os an idea of A~~itation of tsfa°il { 
1- -factor. It is the candidates with clean public images who find Islam politically 
beneficial for them. Thus, the usefulness depends on the reputation of the candidates. 
There are no better candidates to illustrate this argument than the Ismet Ahmad-
Habib Aboe Bakar al-Habsyi team and Sjachriel Darham. In the first case, Islamic 
appeals boosted the vote share, and in the second case, they did not seem to help at 
all. 
The Ismet-Habib Aboe team were an electoral surprise. Political artalysts prior to the 
pilkada put them in an underdog position for several r~asons . The first reason relates 
to the nominating parties, PAN (Partai Amanat N't'i~nal, National Mandate Party) 
and PKS. These Islamic parties are widely believed to have an association with the 
modernist Muslim organisation, Muhammadiyah. In South Kalimantan which has 
·1N ~V .... j ·1 been a strong base for Nahdlatul Ulama, these~iesC];n y se · ured a jo~te-0~ i ~~.:~ ah (__---- Le'"'-{ 
a.. '( ,_ej J 17.9 percent votes in the 2004 general elections. The ·eoo o reason relates to the . ()..>..,. l 
v..o l)Jv_ candidates. Ismet Ahmad was a bureaucrat and an academic who did not have real \....- l 
)lb ill I 1..-',t" 
u. 0- )JI \~ mass support, although he was able to finance his political ambition. Furthermore, 
~ ~~ ~ 
iJ'-J \J. i)-Y Habib Aboe is not a Banjarese, which according to many observers should have <"{ h -.e_ 
l . made him 'unelectable' . 8 In the same vein, a poll conducted by a local newspaper put 1,.-i.k.. 
this pair second last eight weeks prior to election day. 9 But surprisingly, Ismet 4..:.. )J. 
Ahmad and Habib Aboe Bakar al-Habsyi finished second with 28 percent of the Ct....,..<, ]-
votes. This pair was ahead in the first day of vote counting and was worrying other 
·-------
8 Marcus Mietzner, Local Election Briefing: South Kalimantan, 2005, unpublished paper, p. 1 
9 Mohammad Effendy, Potret Pemilihan Gubemur dan Wakil Gubemur Kalimantan Selatan, Upaya 
Membangun Demokrasi Lokal, (Banjarmasin: PT Grafika Wangi Kalimantan, 2006), pp. 172cl 74 
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candidates. 10 If we compare the actual votes of PKS and PAN in the 2004 general 
elections to that of Ismet - Habib Aboe in 2005, the result is more remarkable. In 
2004, the parties won 277,863 votes while in 2005 their governor-deputy governor 
nominees secured 404,880 votes. 11 In other words, there was an increase of over 45 
percent. Thus, the argument that in the elections of executives (President, Governor 
and Bupati), voters tend to see the individual candidates, not the nominating parties; 
proves to be true again in this case. 12 
While one could assume that a portion of the total votes for the Ismet-Habib Aboe 
team came from the loyal PAN and PKS voters, the remaining votes should be 
attributed to the 'skill' of the two candidates. During the campaign, they tried to 
project an image of clean and capable leaders guided by Islam. Here we can see the 
combination of Islam and probity. The pair presented themselves as ulama and 
umara, meaning respectively religious and worldly leaders, teaming up to lead South 
Kalimantan. In this team, Ismet represented the clean umara and Habib Aboe acted as 
ulama. 
Whereas the 'umara-ness' of Ismet was explained by the fact that he was an 
experienced career bureaucrat, the 'ulama-ness' of Habib Aboe was shown primarily 
through his choice of dress. First, he wore a thobe (a collar-less long and lose shirt 
covering the body to ankles) with a turban draped over his shoulder. Most of the time 
he held a rosary, and he carried a small Qur'an with him everywhere. He combined 
this outfit with a coat when he went to parliament or government offices. In this 
Arabic attire, he delivered religious speeches and led the recitation of salawat 
(prayers of adoration to the Prophet Muhammad) during and outside of campaign 
10 
'Ismet Di atas Angin', Banjarmasin Post, 1 July 2005 and 'Sementara 2U unggul', Radar 
Banjarmasin, 1 July 2005. Rudy Ariffin was worried about the first day vote counting, as were the 
other candidates. Interview with Guru Khalilurrahman, an adviser to Rudy, Martapura, 19 May 2008; 
and with Hasanuddin, the former coordinator of JPPR in South Kalimantan, Banjarmasin, 2 May 2008. 
11 The numbers here are also recorded in Mohammad Effendy, Potret Pemilihan Gubernur, pp. 113-4 
12 The argument was put forward, for instance, by Ro_dd McGibbon, 'Indonesian Politics in 2006 : 
stability, compromise and contest over ide01ogy:, Bulf'etin of Indonesian Economic Studies, No. 42, 
vol. 3, 2006, p. 331. Also in Michael Buehler's rep01l on direct elections in South Sulawesi, 'The Rise 
of the clans', Inside I ndon~sia, 90, October-N oyerfiber 2007. 
http) /llrndeiildonefilaNg/2bntenU"ew/l 02 I/29\ viewed Novembce 2008) . 
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events. Second, he wore a white cap (kupiah haji) which later became his trademark 
and featured in the slogan of the pair: cucuk nang bekupiah haji (Banjarese, meaning 
pierce the picture of the one with the white cap). The slogan served two functions; a 
manual for the correct way of voting, that is, making a hole in the picture of one 
candidate, and a reminder of Habib Aboe. It is worth noting that the other candidates 
wore black caps, although all of them are hajis, making the picture of Habib Aboe 
eye catching. (See the picture below.) 
This pair was also unique because the candidate for deputy governor was more 
popular than the candidate for governor. Whenever the ulama-umara pair was 
mentioned, most people automatically thought of Habib Aboe with his kupiah haji. 13 
In their campaign functions, Habib Aboe was the celebrity. Because Aboe Bakar was 
13 The evidence for this is mostly anecdotal but it was commonplace. I observed this in 2005, and 
when I conducted my fieldwork in 2008, people still remembered the kupiah haji and Habib Aboe 
Bakar very clearly. 
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a habib, many people especially in rural areas ran after him to get his blessing. 14 
Personally, Habib Aboe is colorful person who makes people ~ound him entertained. 
·---
Ismet on the other hand, appears to be drier. A local political analyst labeled this as 
'an anomaly' as normally people tend to remember the first man, and then they recall 
his deputy (Sarman 2005). 15 However, I think this is a logical consequence of putting 
emphasis on Habib Aboe. First, in their platform, the cooperation of ulama and 
umara, ulama, as represented by Habib Aboe, is mentioned first. Second, roughly in 
two third of the tens of campaign pictures of this pair published in local papers, 
Habib Aboe was the target of the cameras, leaving Ismet in the background. Even in 
the televised political advertisements for this pair, Habib Aboe was more 
conspicuous. A PKS member of the campaign team appears to confirm this analysis. 
He said that everything about Habib Aboe during the pilkada was purposefully 
designed. 16 
In general, the good showing of the Ismet-Habib Aboe team can be attributed to their 
success at building an image;:-{n which Islam was central. In only three months prior 
v 
to the pilkada, this campaign successfully popularized Ismet Ahmad and Habib Aboe 
Bakar. The winning pair, Rudy and Rosehan, in comparison, started their 'campaign' 
over six months before the pilkada. 17 Yet the voting margin between the winners and 
the Ismet-Habib Aboe team was only 4.3 percent. Specifically, this shows that the 
PKS faction in the campaign team dominated the marketing by focusing on Habib 
Aboe, who is a PKS cadre, more than Ismet. Now, even after this pair lost the pilkada 
race, Habib Aboe remains a popular figure in the province. In a way, this is a political 
investment. Habib Aboe himself appears to realize this and continues to appear in his 
trademark clothing in South Kalimantan. According to another PKS activist, although 
Ismet-Habib Aboe were defeated in 2005, Habib Aboe is now famous and that is 
14 Interview with Ibnu Sina, Banjarmasin, 6 May 2008. He mentions that the thobe of Habib Aboe 
often became dirty after campaign functions because people touched it while he was standing on stage. 
Sometime he saw lipstick marks on the thobe from females who kissed it. 
15 See 'Kupiah Haji Yang Fenomenal', Banjarmasin Post, 5 July 2005. 
16 Interview with Ibnu Sina, Banjarmasin, 6 May 2008. 
17 Hairansyah, Potret Pemilu Langsung Dalam Konteks Demokrasi Di Kalimantan Selatan, a paper 
presented in Banjarmasin in 2005 around three months after thePilkada. Hairansyah was a member of 
the provincial KPUD. 
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good for the next political race. 18 On the other hand, his visibility is also a constraint 
since people tend to be surprised or even shocked to see Habib Aboe not in his 
trademark costume, like a Banjarese tuan guru who met him in Jakarta wearing jeans 
and a shirt. 19 In other words, fame is both rewarding and demanding . . 
However, although Islamic symbols featured prominently in the campaign, this is not 
the whole story. The 'ulama-ness' of Habib Aboe and his memorable white cap were 
combined with the clean reputation of both Habib Aboe and Ismet, at least until the 
\ ,.\., .i...· 
pilkada. Prior to the pilkada, Ismet was not reported in media to have been involved 
-in any corruption. Moreover, local commentators generally saw him as relatively 
clean. As a bureaucrat, he was well known more for his collection of academic titles : 
Professor, Doctor, Engineer (Ir.) and Master of Science (MSc), leaving an impression 
that he was very clever. What became hot news was his ouster from Sekretaris 
Daerah Provinsi (the Provincial Secretary) by Governor Sjachtiel Darham. This 
ousting, however, turned out to be to his advantage because the public understood 
this incident as an example of unethical politics on the part of Sjachriel. That is, 
Sjachriel felt threatened by Ismet who opposed him in the pilkada and thus sacked 
him while he was still in office. Ismet' s mistreatment reminded some people of 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono when he as a minister was treated badly by Megawati 
after he decided to run as a presidential candidate. 20 Ismet was therefore seen as a 
political victim. Habib Aboe Bakar on the other hand, was new to the political scene 
in South Kalimantan. He grew up in Jakarta, had never held any political position in 1 
the province before, andwn~~even a Banjarese. Before the pilkada, he was unknown \ 
except among PKS c~dres and sympathizers. People knew him only as a PKS 
national representative for the South Kalimantan electorate. In this situation, it was 
easy for him to build whatever image was most politically beneficial for him. 
18 Interview with Faqih Jurjani, Barabai, 29 May 2008 
19 Interview with with Gum Hamdan Khalid, Amuntai, 3 July 2008 
20 Interview with Norhalis Majid, the head of Banjarmasin KPU, Banja1masin, 7 and 11 May 2008; 
and with Hasanuddin, Banjarmasin, 2 May 2008. 
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The history of both candidates, as people knew it then, made it easy for their team to 
construct them as clean and pious people. The central theme repeatedly raised by this 
pair in the media and campaign functions was the need for leaders with such 
qualities. This again indicates the strong influence of PKS, which was successful in ~ ~ 
2004 general elections in part because of tj~~clean image,21 in this pair's marketing /'" 
strategy. In the statement of support made by Guru Muhammad Bakhit of Barabai, it 
was emphasized that the Ismet-Habib Aboe team possessed such qualities. 22 ~  lf tli 
headline appearing in the following week reads 'Fit in the Category Q(P,.i00sLeaders, \1 e. 
Ismet Ahmad-Habib Aboe Bakar in the Ey~s of Prominent ulama' .23 'South C,,.~~ 
4 Kalimantan needs pious leaders", read another headline two days after that. 24 The 
{ 
team could not have used this issue had the candidates had a corrupt or bad ~~'1 ~ 
· 
0 
~ \A...,. \I. reputation. And, as it turned out, this worked very well for Ismet and Habib Aboe. 
Li>r v-v "l>'"~c"J!'/vi In contrast, Islam did not seem to work at all for Sjachriel Darham \vho, as mentioned 
9-~. above, brought along Guru Ahmad Bakeri in his campaign, donated generously to 
several big pesantren, and so on. In addition, all the advantages he had as the 
incumbent, from fame and networking/ t o a financial surplus, were seemingly washed 
away. He even had trouble finding political parties to nominate him in the pilkada 
before the coalition of PDI-P and PBR (Partai Bintang Reformasi, Star Reform Party) 
agreed to be his political vehicle. PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United 
Development Party) which nominated him in 2000 for his first gubernatorial term 
had chosen Rudy Ariffin as its candidate. Golkar was the traditional political enemy 
of Sjachriel, and although he tried to approach it, the party leaders decided to support ~O"'"'l~ 
(!).>-
Gusti Iskandar as the gubernatorial candidate. PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional,'°''""'~~ 
-~-· 
National Mandate Party) played around with Sjachriel: its leader, Yudhi Wahyuni 
once said that Sjachriel had a very bad credibility and PAN was closed for him but 
then, the party accepted Sjachriel's proposal for candidacy along with eight other 
21 See for instance in, Edward Asp~-'Elections and the normalization of politics in Indonesia', 
South East Asia Research, 13, 2, 2005~f 117- l 56 
22 
'Gum Ba.khit dan Gum Parnangkih Sukung Penuh Ismet-Habib' , Banjarmasin Post, 6 June 2005. 
The report also appeared in Radar Banjarmasin and the Kalimantan Post on the same day. 
23 
'Memenuhi Kriteria Pemimpin Saleh', Kalimantan Post, 13 June 2005 
24 
'Kalsel Memerlukan Pemimpin yang Saleh' Radar Banjarmasin, 15 June 2008 
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aspiring candidates' proposals25 and in the end, it turned him down by choosing 
Ismet Ahmad. 
As a politician, Sjachriel appeared to like political controversies and journalists loved 
interviewing him because everything about him was likely to make headlines. 26 He 
had irrepressible confidence that some people thought was arrogance. His statements 
were sound bites. In addition to being high profile, he was also cunning at playing the 
political game. Sjachriel came to office in 2000, Mietzner (2005) notes, basically by 
buying enough votes from the local MPs to defeat Golkar's candidates. 27 In 2002, he 
was impeached over a controversy concerning a maintenance project (pengerukan 
alur Barito, the dredging of Barito canal) by the same DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan 
Daerah, regional assembly) that elected him. Golkar was the political force behind 
this. However, there was then uncertainty about who had the authority to discharge a 
governor: the DPRD or the Minister oflnternal Affairs. 28 Sjachriel 'spent a few weeks 
in Jakarta lobbying the Ministry and then came back to South Kalimantan victorious. 
He continued to be the governor until his term lapsed in 2005. Here, he proved to be 
politically astute by taking advantage of a hole in the law. His case became national 
news and later a reference when the lawmakers modified the Law on 
Decentralization. Praising himself, Sjachriel was reported to have said that he was 
politically more astute than President Gus Dur (Abdurrahman Wahid) who failed to 
escape impeachment in 2001. 
Another controversy involving Sjachriel and the DJ>~over two projects (the 
exchange of state assets [ruislag] and th~ construction of Martapura river flood plain) 
surfaced again at the end of 2004fbeginning of 2005. The press recorded the 
exchanging of arguments and commeti.rsOf Sjachriel and the opponent factions in the 
DPRD, but by then most parties had begun to shift their attentionf to the pilkada. In 
each of the cases, Sjachriel was allegedly corrupt and using money to mollify the 
25 
'Hari ini Sjachriel diuji', Banjarmasin Post, 23 January 2005 
26 The numbers here are also recorded in Mohammad Effendy, Potret Pemilihan Gubernur, pp. 78-9 
27 Marcus Mietzner, Local Election Briefing, p. I 
28 See for instance in 'Pemberhentian Gubemur Kalsel Belum Sah', Tempo Interaktif, 22 August 2002 
http://www.infmmda.com/linksfollow.php?lh=UOcECQUDBwYG (viewed December 2008) 
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controversies. This damaged his reputation and he must have realized it. He was not 
convicted, however, until the KPK investigated an allegation of corruption in the 
usage of the provincial budget, after the pilkada, which finally put him behind bars. 29 
Moreover, his reputation within the bureaucracy had not been good either. He was 
reported to have extorted money from his subordinates, the heads of regional 
government agencies. 30 Although the local media did not pick up on this practice, 
which only circulated as rumors and gossip among. local public servant, the press did 
expose his dismissal of Ismet Ahmad and, as mentioned above, that created another 
controversy which did more damage to him. It is worth noting that the critical tone of 
the press towards Sjachriel was not unbiased. The leading local paper in South 
Kalimantan, the Banjarmasin Post, is managed by Gusti Rusdi Effendy, a leader of 
the Golkar party which in 2002 mobilized Sjachriel's impeachment. Since then, the 
two figures have become political enemies. This is of course not to suggest that every 
report about Sjachriel by this daily must have been biased. But it is reasonable to 
assume that some of them were politically motivated. 
Despite this, Sjachriel was very confident about his candidacy. He stayed cool when 
PPP, Golkar and PAN refused to nominate him as their gubernatorial candidate. After 
loosing some time trying to find a nominating party, he said calmly that a good 
runner knows when to start. With regard to Rudy Ariffin who had begun his 
campaign much earlier, he commented mockingly that Rudy would run out of puff. 31 
His confidence appeared justifiable because until around two months before the 
pilkada he still seemed to be ahead of other candidates whose campaigns were yet to 
bare fruit. When asked whether he was prepared to lose, he answered boldly that 
there is no such thing as being prepared to lose; he was only prepared to win. 32 And 
29 
'Mantan Gubemur Kalsel Divonis 4 Tahun Penjara' ,Antara, 24 Agustus 2007 
'Sjachriel Darham Akui Pakai Dana 902 Juta' , Tempo Interaktif, 16 Agustus 2007, 
http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2007 /08/l 6/brk,20070816-1057 56,id.html (viewed, 17 
January 2009); 'Aset Lebih dari Rp 1,7 Miliar Milik Sjachriel Disita KPK' , Sinar Harapan,, 19 Juni 
w~ . 
30 Afraid of being sacked, most of them provided the money reluctantly. A discussion with an officer 
of a regional agency, Banjarmasin, Agustus 2005 
31 See in 'Rudy Ngaku All Out', Radar Banjarmasin, 24 December 2004 
32 See in 'Tolak Bujuk DPC-DPC PDI-P', Banjarmasin Post, 12 June 2005 
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even after he was defeated in the gubernatorial election he still made news. Not 
appearing to lose self-esteem, he said that he had profited from the pilkada because 
he only used two thirds of the total funds he had raised to finance his campaign. 33 
Apparently, it was not until he was imprisoned that he looked sorry, saying to a 
journalist who interviewed him in jail, 'this is how I am now'. 34 
Sjachriel Darham. 
Photos are taken from www.indomedia.com 
Sjachriel was a 'sinking' politician whose reputation could not be rescued. Political 
observers cite him as an example of corrupt punished leaders. 35 GJru Ahmad Bakeri 
fai led to help him in the pilkada. Donations Sjachriel made to big pesantren and 
numerous communities did not seem to work to his advantage. His best pilkada result 
was in Kabupaten (district) Hulu Sungai Utara in which he finished third. In 
Kabupaten Kotabaru and Hulu Sungai Tengah he was last, while in the ten remaining 
Kabupaten he was second last, just like his overall ranking. 
The damaged reputation of Sjachriel might, in fact, contribute to a temporary 
decrease in Guru Bakeri' s charisma. One indication of this was the decreasing 
attendance at his pengajian as reported by some congregation of the provincial 
mosque, Mesjid Raya Sabilal Muhtadin. Guru Bakeri' s association with a 
controversial politician who faced many corruption allegations and was finally 
convicted rebounded on him. Some of his congregation chose to attend the pengajian 
33 However, in the report of the campaign fund usage that Sjachriel submitted to the South Kalimantan 
KPU, there was no mention of this remaining fund (sisa dana). See Mohammad Effendy , Potret 
Pemilihan Gubernur, pp. 188-9 
34 http://www.banjarmasinpost.co.id/content/view/29259/288 (viewed September 2008) · 
35 For example, Marcus Mietzner, 'Local dembcracy, Old elites are still in power, but direct elections 
now give voters a choice ', Inside Indonesia, Jan-March 2006 
hto://w,vw.insideindonesia.or content/viewll 10/29/ (viewed 12 October 2007) 
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of another tuan guru, Guru Juhdi, who avoided politics. But there are several other 
reasons why people prefer Guru Juhdi. First, he does not make indecent jokes as 
often as Guru Bakeri does. 36 Second, Guru Juhdi explains sophisticated Islamic 
concepts in simple language, whereas Guru Bakeri sometimes uses complicated 
terminology. 37 Guru Bakeri, however, is still popular and his pengajian in Mesjid 
Raya and in many other places is still attracting hundreds or even thousands of 
attendees. This may indicate that people are quick to 'forgive' him and accept that his 
involvement with Sjachriel was mainly motivated by the urge to maintain his 
pesantren. Besides, people come to him mainly for his deep understanding of Islam, 
so when he talks politics, they turn off. 
~· __.::--------
Conclusion 
The prominence of Islam during the pilkada campaign could be deceiving. It has led 
some observers to think that Islam is the key factor determining the performance of 
the candidates. The case studies discussed above show us the multi-causal 
relationship between Islam and other factors to explain the pilkada. By considering 
------multi-causal relationship, the performance of the candidates, from excellent to poor, 
----could be better understood. Islam without reference to a shrewd campaign and 
importantly, good reputation, does not explain the achievement of Ismet Ahmad and 
Habib Aboe Bakar al-Habsyi. The same analysis more obviously works regarding the 
poor performance of Sjachriel Darham who had Islamic elements in his campaign but 
lacked other factors such as a clean name and enough preparation. If we check the 
winning candidates' secret formula, not only did they possess what the Ismet-Habib 
----Aboe team had i.e. heavy Islamic elements and a good image, they also had a longer 
preparation and sufficient funds to endure the long campaign (compare with 
Hairansyah 2005, Effendy 2006). In all cases, Islam serves as the basic ingredient but 
success is contingent upon the presence of other qualities to help enlarge the 
candidates' share of votes. 
36 Interview with four attendants of pengajian of Mesj id Ray a Sabilal Muhatadin, Banj arrnasin, 15 
May and 2 June 2008. My field observations Banjarmasin, 9, 15 and 16 May 2008 
37 Interview with Pak No, 13 May 2008; My field observations Banjaimasin, 9, 15 and 16 May 2008 
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This contingency is a reflection of people's voting behavior. That is, voters consider 
multiple reasons, from a candidate's Islamic credentials, to their capability and to 
their record of accomplishments. Voters may not be very critical of what the 
candidates presented and promised. Yet they respond according to what they know, 
and they voted out a leader like Sjachriel. Unfortunately, the image that the 
candidates constructed during the campaign might belie the reality. Thus, voters gave 
a big share to a clean-image candidate like Ismet Ahmad who turned out not to be 
that clean. In 2007, he was investigated for a corruption allegation and became wv, c~c..y} --defendant but his case has not been tried until now. Had this happened prior to the 
---· pilkada, the story would have been different. But of course, the voters of South 
Kalimantan would not deliver victory to non Muslim candidates even if they have 
good and clean reputations. That is to say, Islam is still an important consideration. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PRAGMATIC OR IDEALISTIC: 
Tuan Guru's Motivation to Campaign for Candidates 
Sjachriel has done a lot, here. He bought [this pesantren] a tractor .. . and put me in charge of the 
managing board of Mesjid Raya. When he asked for help [in the campaign), I had to lend a hand. 
- Guru Ahmad Bakeri, the head of Pesantren al-Mursyidul Amin, Gambut 1 
They did not donate to this pesantren. In fact, I spent my own money when hosting them in my home 
and accompanying them to socialize their candidacy in Barabai. The other candidates donated, but I 
supported Ismet-Habib Aboe because they are clean and pious. 
- Guru Muhammad Bakhiet, the head of Pesantren Nurul Muhibbien, Barabai 2 
Introduction 
One consequence of being a popular tuan guru is attracting politicians. The 
thousands of people attending tuan guru 's pesantren and pengajian (Islamic learning 
forums) are potential voters. No serious politician can afford to r e ~ht~lk of 
voters uut,o.uelrecrw.ithn.uLtr.y..i..ag-t-e-win-them-ev-er. Making contacts and cultivating 
good relationships with the men who lead the masses is one way of doing it. In effect, 
popular tuan guru often find themselves collaborating with politicians. Some like it 
because the contacts potentially lead to mutual relations or even political careers for 
them or their families. Others dislike it as they avoid politics and because most of the 
politicians come to exploit them for political gain, not for religious consultation. In 
principle, the politicians want tuan guru to help them getting votes. 
1 Intel\liew with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 2008 
2 Intel\liew with Guru Muhammad Bakhiet, Barabai, 31 May 2008 
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This is not something new. During the New Order period, many ulama delivered 
votes to the regime's party, Golkar, in exchange for patronage and protection of their 
communities (Bruinessen 1994 ). 3 They abandoned the call to channel Muslim votes 
to the only Islamic party then, PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United 
Development Party) because they found it not only unprofitable but also harmful. 
The 'stick and carrot' method of the New Order regime made them side with the 
government. Rather than face oppression and intimidation, they chose limited 
political and economic advancement. Political Islam and Muslim solidarity, although 
desirable and laudable in hardship for some Muslims, came at too high a price. 
The fall of Suharto in 1998 changed Indonesia's political environment significantly. 
Politics was freed from state intimidation and has opened up, leading to the 
proliferation of political parties, roughly half of which are Islamic. Two free and fair 
elections were held in 1999 and 2004. Golkar no longer has the sirl.gle majority and 
has to compete equally with other parties, without state support as in the New Order 
period. More recent changes mean that political executives from president to bupati 
are elected directly by the people. Under these new circumstances, the political role 
of ulama as a source for support mobilisation appears to continue. The indications for 
this include the fact that pesantren and pengajian are visited by candidates at the 
election time and ulama, as discussed in the previous chapter, are 'recruited as 
campaigners. There is furthermore/ a new trend that suggests the expansion of the 
ulama's political role: they con{pete for political power. Some ulama run as 
candidates, and several of them successfully come to power: Abdurrahman Wahid, 
who became president (1999-2001) is the prime example of this trend; but other 
ulama have served as governors, as in West Nusa Tenggara, or bupatis (regency or 
district heads) or deputy bupati, as in Kebumen and Madura. 4 Many have also been 
3 Brninessen, Martin van. (1990) 'Indonesia's ulama and politics: caught between legitimising the 
status quo and searching for alternatives ', Prisma - The Indonesian Indicator (Jakarta), No, 49, 52-
69. 
4 For a study on Kiai and Politics in Kebumen see, Sidik Jatmika, Kiai dan Politik Lokal, Studi Kasus 
Reposisi Politik Kiai NU Kebumen, Jawa Tengah Memanfaatkan Peluang Keterbukaan Partisipasi di 
Era Reformasi, Doctoral Thesis in the Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, unpublished. 
The recent study on Madurese Kiai see, Abdul Gaffar Karim, 'Pesantren in Power: religious 
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elected as members of parliament at both local and national levels, although this is 
not entirely new because in the 1950s this had occurred. _ (L) v.; J-R . 
The opening up of politics can explain why ulama compete for political power: as 
members of a religious elite, they, like members of other elites, may have political 
aspirations that they can now seek to fulfil. But what of those ulama who do not seek 
political office and confine themselves mainly to education but find themselves being 
approached by politicians to secure their votes? What does this new political situation 
mean for them? Does it change the way they see politics and politicians? With the 
absence of tight state control and intimidation (the New Order's stick), what seems to 
remain is the incentive: .political and economic advancement. What one could 
conclude from that is that the motivation of ulama now to support aspiring politicians 
is mainly advancement, either personal or of their communities. _ ..  
In this chapter, I examine the extent to which this conclusion is true. On the whole, I 
think the argument carries some truth but it reflects only one sip~ qf the reality. There 
v-.-~ t. t..ll ' 
are some tuan guru primarily motivated by the hope of advancement. However, the 
other side of the new reality is that as a result of greater political freedom, those tuan 
guru with particular visions of politics or who are associat~d with cultural and 
religious sentiment can freely support whomever they want regardless of the rewards 
~ ·\e..­
they_get in return. In other words~,..e. on.omic and political advancement . are not only 
~ -....:::\ ' . \:_=:n guru.:1 dr~ving mot~vations. ith reference to the 20.05 South Kalimant~n 
gu ernatonal pzlkada, I will demonstrate that these two groupings of tuan guru exist 
side by side: those who choose to support candidates for idealistic reasons, and those 
who base their decisions on calculations of future gain. 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to examining the tuan guru who were 
involved in the campaigns of gubernatorial candidates. The first section discusses 
tuan guru who are motivated by Ix service exchang~. The following section studies 
institutions and Political recruitment in Sumenep, Madura ', Review of Indonesian and Malaysian 
Affairs, v.42, no. l , 2008: (157)-184. 
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those motivated by non-material rewards or exchange. In the conclusion, I offer some 
implications of these findings to the political role of ulama as vote getters. 
Exchanging Service 
As was true during the New Order period, the exchanging of services was an 
important motivation for tuan guru to support politicians in the 2005 pilkada. While 
this exchange works similarly in all places, namely each party gives something or 
service for the other, some variations may not exist outside South Kalimantan. I 
discovered two kinds of service exchange, both of which were marked by tacit 
negotiations. First, politicians and tuan guru cultivated good relationships prior to the 
pilkada involving donations, facilities and positions in religious establishments given 
by the former to the latter. Such actions created a sense of indebtedness on the part of 
the tuan guru, and when the election arrived and the politicians asked them to help 
campaign, the tuan guru found it morally difficult to deny them. Some tuan guru 
predicted this beforehand and answered the call positively when the request came. 
Others took advantage of the obscurity of the donor's intention and opened their 
doors to other candidates as well, although in the end they still delivered the votes to 
the first candidate. 
·~ 
Second, tuan guru received honoraria for campaigning for the candidates, and when 
the candidates won, they received bonuses in various forms. Candidates often did not 
make it clear what tuan guru were going to gain if they helped with the campaigning. 
This was particularly the case with tuan guru who did not have pesantren. Such tuan 
guru, although popular, have more difficulties securing the votes of their followers 
than those heads of pesantren who exert more influence over their students. 
Politicians still counted on the tuan guru because voters outside the pesantren 
community outnumbered that of the pesantren community. But without specific 
promises, politicians have flexibility when they need to pay back the tuan guru. 
r --;;) ~J 'i Vt.<z- \' ~ C 
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Sense of indebtedness: the case of Guru Ahmad Bakeri 
Guru Ahmad Bakeri (born 1959) is a tuan guru who became political to develop his 
pesantren. 5 He joined Golkar in the New Order period expecting road building and 
electricity installation to reach his pesantren's area. He correctly identified that only 
the government, which was controlled by Golkar, could provide such infrastructure. 
The road and electricity improve the quality and accessibility of his pesantren and in 
tum, attract more students to come. The price he had to pay was his removal from the 
list of Friday sermon deliverers in a Banjarmasin based mosque whose manager was 
a PPP Qdeological) upporter. It is worth noting that until 1982 voters in Banjarmasin 
city alway~red of PPP over Golkar. 6 
Guru Bakeri started his career by holding a regular 
pengajian in a village expounding his knowledge of 
Islamic teachings to the community. He married the 
daughter of a Penghulu (a person in charge of 
conducting marriage ceremonies and, at the same 
time, a person oflslamic knowledge in a village) who 
was a rich landowner. 7 Having enough support and 
sufficient resources, he opened Pesantren al-
Mursyidul Amin in the early 1980s. Over time, the 
number of pengajian he gave increased, reflecting the 
growth of his popularity. In 2008, he had 21 regular 
pengajian every week; three of them were attended 
by 1000 to 5000 people. 8 He is invited to neighboring 
5 Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 2008 
6 Kevin Evans, Sejarah Pemilu dan Parpol di Indonesia (Jakarta: PT. Arise Consultancies, 2003), p. 
92 
7 Interview with Saifuddin (pseudonym), a villager living close to Guru Bakeri's Pesantren, Gambut, 
Banjar district, 24 May 2008 
8 Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 2008 
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provinces as well to give talks. Furthermore, his pesantren accommodates over 800 
students, male and female; around half of them live in the pesantren complex. 9 This 
has all been achieved befor~ reaching 50 years of age. 
'- . \. \A~- ~ v J'..ll () 
The more popular he has become, the easier it is for him to collect donations of cash, 
land and building materials for the pesantren. 10 The list of donors ranges from 
ordinary people to the rich composed mainly of landowners, traders and government 
officials. Since the year of 2000, one government official who generously provided 
facilities for this pesantren was Governor Sjachriel Darham. As discussed below, 
Governor Sjachriel's donations were the motivation for Guru Bakeri's political 
support of Sjachriel. However, Guru Bakeri is also notable for having an independent 
source of income, namely hectares of paddy fields . He keeps accumulating pesantren 
wealth by trading and providing services frome ajj supervision (bimbingan 
ibadah haji) the profits of which are returned to tlie pesaritr,_en co min unity. 11 Thus, he 
supports his pesantren by combining service exchan~e with politicians and 
independent societal fund raising, as well as other types of e1onomic activity. 
\...__--- 0J \... ~ L 
In the 2005 gubernatorial pilkada, Guru Bakeri campaigned for Sjachriel Darham. 
The story of the relationship between these two is an excellent illustration of ulama 
and politicians exchanging services. Governor Sjachriel bought a tractor and a water 
tanker for Guru Bakeri 's pesantren. 12 The tractor was to make the cultivation of his 
vast paddy fields efficient, while the tanker was to transport clean water ·for the 
pesantren community which is even today still not connected to the state-owned 
water supply. When this pesantren was building a new musalla (a house of prayer 
9 Interview with Fakhriadi, a junior teacher in al-Mursyidul Amin, Gambut, Banj ar district, 24 May f .. . -z_ 
2008 rv'-'-'- . 
10 Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 2008 / ~ o S: 
11 This pesantren charges low student fees (300,000 rupiah a year exclusive of meals and 7 ,000 mpiah .......... .J.J,~ 
each month for electricity). It pays the salaries of its teachers annually (f~om five million rupiah) in 
advance. It also provides free food during Ramadan for students who wish'to remam m the pesantren 
and a package of basic needs (sembako) for every teacher. It has built new classrooms, musalla and 
dormitories, established a radio station and, recently, provides all teachers with h_ealth insurance, cl"' li 
something never before heard of in any pesantren in South Kahmantan. (Interview with Guru Ahmad 1 
..:., ·k.Q 
le...u,,.,~~ 
Bakeri, his brother and a junior teacher named F akhriadi, Gambut, Banj ar District 24 May 2008) . -
12 Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 2008 and my field observatif, ) 
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which does not hold Friday prayers), Sjachriel donated over 25 million rupiah. 13 
Governor Sjachriel also appointed Guru Bakeri to manage the provincial mosque, 
which is subsidized by the government. This appointment, although not rewarding 
financially, improved his profile and gave him elevated status. He, a village man, 
pesantren educated only, holding no single formal academic title, now manages the 
provincial mosque. 14 Moreover, talking to Sjachriel was easy for Guru Bakeri, 
creating a solution for others who needed help to lobby the governor, as was the case 
~ ~ .... ---
of the head of the South Kalimantan Religious Affairs Department (DEPAG) who 
wanted to build a mosque in the province' s Asrama Haji 15 . Overall, Guru Bakeri was 
impressed by Sjachriel's way of treating him and he felt indebted. All of th,&~k { 
place before the pilkada period. 
Participation in Sjachriel's campaign f~~in June 2005 was Guru Bakeri's 
repayment. Citing a Qur'anic verse, "Shall the reward of good 1 be anything but 
good", 16 Guru Bakeri sees his involvement as an observance of a moral obligation, 
which i§~ to help a person who had done him favors .17 "Sjachriel wanted the second 
~~lped him, mindless of the final outcome as it was up to the people to d~id©:', says Guru Bakeri in retrospect. 18 As evidence of his participation as 
payback, he claims to have returned a 10 million rupiah honorarium delivered by 
Sjachriel's assistant to him. 19 
13 Interview with Fakhriadi , Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 2008 
14 Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 2008 
15 Asrama Haji is the facility to train and to accommodate hajj pilgrims before departing to and upon 
their return from Mecca. Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 2008 
16 Al-Qur'an, Chapter (surah) ar-Rahman, verse 60. The translation is from Abdel Haleem, The 
Qur 'an (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 355. 
17 Interview with Ustadz Abdurrahman, a colleague of Guru Bakeri, Banjarbaru, 22 May 2008; with 
Ustadz Husni Nurin, a preacher, Banjarmasin, 8 May 2008. 
18 Interview with Guru Bakeri, Gambut, Kabupaten Banjar, 24 May 2008 
19 Interview with Guru Bakeri, Gambut, Kabupaten Banjar, 24 May 2008 
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Built on paddy fields a). classrooms and b) . dormitory of pesantren al-Mursyidul Amin, Gambut, 
Banjar district, South Kalimantan 
c) . Students of al Mursyidul Amin are bathing and taking ablutions in the river in front of the 
pesantren complex. Clean water is used for drinking and cooking only. 
d) . The newly built musalla of Pesantren al-Mursyidul Amin. 
Tacit negotiation 
The negotiation between Sjachriel and Guru Bakeri on exchanging services was tacit, 
not clearly expressed. Sjachriel did not mention that he wanted political support when 
he provided facilities and made donations. He did not want to leave an impression 
that he was not sincere. However, Guru Bakeri did not seem surprised when Sjachriel 
asked for his participation in the campaign, as if he had predicted this in advance. 
Apparently, he was aware that nothing is free in politics an~ played this straight. .-- e ~. 
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In comparison, the head of another large pesantren played with the unspoken interest 
behind donations made by politicians. He understood that politicians must have 
hidden interests when they show generosity, especially during election time. His 
policy was that he would not accept any donation tied to a commitment to support a 
particular candidate. The candidates who visited the pesantren usually said vaguely 
that they sought support, blessing or prayers, and the tuan guru diplomatically 
answered, "Insya Allah, we'll support you and pray for you". 20 But, so long as the 
politicians did not state clearly that they expected his students' votes, which was 
often the case, he would pretend that they were sincere and did not want anything in 
return. He also refused to have voting booths inside the pesantren complex, avoiding 
the revelation of the community's political choice. Rather than being trapped in 
politicians' games, this tuan guru played the politicians. In effect, his pesantren 
benefited from four gubernatorial candidates. Sjachriel funded the construction of a 
new wing of the dormitory and another floor of pesantren library. Rudy Ariffin, 
Ismet Ahmad and Gusti Iskandar made donations when they visited this pesantren 
prior to the pilka.da. A student of this pesantren was awarded a travel grant to the 
Hadramaut, 21 Yemen, a scheme initiated by Rudy Ariffin to attract pesantren 
communities' support. At the end, however, the head of this pesantren advised their .. _.---w\.~ . ..: rJJ 
students to allocate their votes to the four candidates who had donated. 22 ThiS·.---; :s L; 
, / ' 
the quid pro quo for the politicians' efforts from this tuan guru. We do not know if 
the students obeyed this and neither does the tuan guru, because they voted in the 
saqie po~~ as the voters from the neighboring area, but that did not matter to 
hi~. ", ~\\ -
In exchanging services, politicians and tuan guru negotiated but, many times, tacitly. 
They did not really talk about the price that should be paid for political support. They 
did not even directly mention the delivering of votes when donations were handed in. 
In a way, this is a kind of 'gentle politics' involving unspoken messages from both 
~r 
20 Confidential interview, Barabai, 30 May 2008 
21 Hadramaut is a new destination for traditionalist Muslims to study and make pilgrimage to . 
Interview with Habib Ali Haidar al-Kaff, Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008 
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parties. Politicians do not wish to imp~ that they want to buy votes with the 
/ 
donations; they want to show concern to get sympathy . . On the other hand, tuan guru 
do not mind helping if politicians show some effof.', But, the unspoken messages ( 
also mean obscure messages. The discussion above suggests that it would be 
disadvantageous for politicians if tuan guru chose to play out the obscurity. But, as 
suggested below, the obscurity can also give politicians greater flexibility when it 
comes to rewarding tuan guru. This usually happens to popular tuan guru who do not 
have pesantren and have cemented a relationship with the politician before the 
election. 
Campaigning for honoraria and other rewards 
Tuan guru generally receive honoraria for their 'religious services' such as delivering 
Islamic lectures and leading various rites. For some of them, 1 honoraria are a 
secondary source of income, which is morally acceptable and legally permissible. 23 
Thus, when the practice of giving honoraria was brought into the campaign, some 
tuan guru may have been after the money when they agreed to participate. Besides, it 
would have occurred to them that politicians who had resources to run in an election 
must have had deep pockets. 
In line with the tacit negotiation practice, candidates did not state the actual amount 
of the honoraria when they asked tuan guru to give talks. There is a practical 
explanation for this: most popular tuan guru in South Kalimantan do not have 
managers that negotiate such things as honoraria, transportation and so on. In 
addition, the local culture still considers it taboo to negotiate amounts when the 
matter is seen as being more about helping each other than doing pure business. 
23 However, there are Sufi teachers who teach their pupils to be economically self-sufficient, if not 
rich, before they start teaching and preaching. Guru Muhammad Zaini; my personal notes when I 
attended his pengajian in the late 1990s. Guru Bakeri also quotes Guru Zaini 's argument to legitimize 
himself as being a rich Tuan Guru. Interview with Guru Bakeri, Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 
2008. Although receiving honoraria does not necessarily denote insincerity, they argue that sincerity 
(ikhlas) is easier to achieve if one is self-sufficient. One substantial sign of sincerity, another tuan guru 
argues, is calmness: those who grumble are not sincere. Guru Zuhdi in his weekly lecture in Mesjid 
Raya Sabilal Muhtadin. My field notes on 15 May 2008. 
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Besides, it would appear materialistic if a tuan guru put a price tag on his time and 
services. Thus, it was entirely up to the candidates to decide how much they wished 
to compensate the tuan guru, which in turn led to variations in the amounts. 
Nevertheless, there seemed to be a loose guideline: the honoraria should not be less 
than what a tuan guru usually got from giving a sermon. Thus the more popular a 
tuan guru, the larger the amount a candidate must pay. Evidence suggests that the 
range is between a hundred thousand and one million rupiah per session. 24 
I would argue that while honoraria are important in some cases, in general they 
cannot satisfactorily explain the motivations of Tuan Guru. First, popular tuan guru 
could generate the same amount of money without getting involved in any 
campaigning. We would find at most a few not-so-popular-tuan guru who might be 
driven by honoraria, because the candidates preferred those with big names who in 
fact had alternative sources of income. Second, if honoraria had been a significant 
driving force, one would have seen tuan guru rushing to support the financially 
strongest candidates, such as Sjachriel Darham, which they did not in fact do. That is 
to say, honoraria explain some but not all of the behavior of tuan guru. However, 
because receiving honoraria was standard and the money was reasonably good, we 
also cannot discount the importance of the payment of honoraria as a motivation for 
some tuan guru. One tuan guru, for instance, told me of his disappointment in only 
getting two 'envelopes' (i.e. honoraria) for speaking in three different campaign 
events. 25 
Moreover, there were clearly tuan guru who looked for longer term rewards beyond . 
honoraria. They, while also accepting the money, had a personal agenda with the 
candidates. They wanted to improve their personal relations with important 
politicians, in the hope this would lead to economic and political opportunities. This 
motivation was strong enough to make them work hard during the campaign, perhaps 
harder than the activists of the nominating parties. Thus, candidates got serious and 
24 Calculated based on the information given by various Tuan Guru campaigners. 
25 Confidential interview 9 June 2008 
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hardworking tuan guru who campaigned in exchange for future rewards. Since the 
ability of the politicians to deliver their promises was still dependent on the pilkada 
results, essentially, this kind of tuan guru was wagering on the fate of the candidates. 
But wl:in the candidates won, the tuan guru found themselves rewarded. I:{ 
Habib Ali Haidar al-Kaff (b. 1979) is the prime example of this type of tuan guru. 26 
He is a young and talented ulama with ambition and, perhaps, luck because he 
supported the would-be winning candidates, Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan NB. Born 
into an ulama family, he was sent to study Islam in the Hadramaut, Yemen. As a 
fresh graduate, he started up a promising pengajian in his parent's house in 
Banjarmasin city, attracting mainly young people. He also organized weekly local 
pilgrimages to the graves of holy figures with a group of Banjarmasin youth. He and 
his family later attracted the attention of the city's PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 
Justice and Prosperity Party) branch which was broadening its political base to face 
the 2004 general elections. Habib Ali was included in the party's advisory board, and 
PKS nominated three of his cousins as legislative candidates in ~a~armasin l 
municipality electorate. This was the first major political experience of the family, 
which unfortunately turned sour, leading to the termination of their relationship with 
PKS. In 2004, Habib Ali's cousins were not elected as parliamentarians although 
they gained larger votes, three to five times more than those of the top list party 
candidates. Apparently, their votes did not exceed the minimum number of votes that \ 
allowed any candidate to win a seat. In such case, the election law stipulated that the 
votes were added to the votes of the first listed candidates, who then took the seats in 
the DPRD Banjarmasin. Moreover, the party activists did not show up again in Habib 
Ali's pengajian, and then Habib Ali was removed from the party's advisory board, 
making it clear that the party had used the family for electoral purposes only. Feeling 
very disappointed, the family eventually decided to announce publicly that they no 
longer had any association with PKS. Surprised with this response, PKS politicians 
approached the family but it was too late. 
lol.V 
ru. .• .J .. ..:11 
~u cLj 
(),(,, 
26 The information in this section is based on my interview with Habib Ali Haidar Al-Kaff, 
Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008 and Arridla Annawan, a local journalist, Banjarmasin, 14 May 2008. 
tA 
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Habib Ali's second chance to enter the world of politics came from his relationship 
with Rudy Ariffin in 2005. Rudy met Habib Ali in January when he was recruiting 
campaigners .27 Impressed by this young tuan guru, Rudy added Habib Ali to his 
' army' of campaigners, which was mainly composed of PPP and PKB activists and 
tuan guru who were affiliated with the parties. The late Guru Zaini Sekumpul, the 
spiritual father and teacher of Rudy, supported Habib Ali ' s entry on to Rudy's team. 
Thus Habib Ali was a non-aligned individual working with party activists. When 
Rudy traveled across the province to meet potential voters, Habib Ali was always 
with him. 28 He proposed the travel grant program to Hadramaut, mentioned above. / 
He was also involved in lobb~')ome tuan guru and overtly supported Rudy. \ 
Moreover, he participated in all cam~hign functions held by the Rudy-Rosehan team 
in June 2005. In short, he was an important member of Rudy' s team. 
After Rudy won the pilkada, Habib Ali was well 
rewarded. He was one of two people who got a 
car from Rudy, creating jealousy among the 
members of the Rudy-Rosehan team. 29 Here, ' the 
tacit negotiation' gives flexibility to Rudy. That 
is, while there were other members of the team 
who also deserved the reward because of their 
hard work, Rudy only gave the cars to Habib Ali 
and one other tuan guru. In the same vein, Rudy 
rewarded still another tuan guru who actually 
spoke only in two informal campaign events with 
27 Interview with Habib Ali, Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008 
28 Interview with Habib Ali, Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008; with Jamhuri, a member of Rudy-Rosehan 
team, Banjarmasin, 3 May 2008; with Ustadz Husni Nurin, a PKB local parliamentarian, Banjarmasin, 
8 May 2008. 
29 Interview with Guru Hamdan Khalid, Amuntai, 3 June 2008; with Ahmad Syazali, an activist in a 
Banjarmasin based NGO, LK3 [spell this out here ifnot previously mentioned], Banjarmasin, 2 and 3 
May 2008 
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a free hajj pilgrimage. 30 Moreover, when Rudy assumed the leadership of the South 
Kalimantan PPP in 2007, he appointed Habib Ali a deputy with a newly created 
portfolio on Youth and Religion. Finally, Habib Ali also joined the trips to the annual 
commemoration of the death (haulan) of Guru Syarwani Abdan Bangil, in East Java 
and of Habib Anis, Solo, in Central Java. Rudy and Rosehan funded the trips to 
reward Nahdlatul Ulama tuan guru and their supporters. 
Non-service exchange 
Candidate identification 
The motivation to support politicians is not limited to the attraction of exchanging 
services or expecting material rewards. There are other factors that are rather more 
t 
intangible like identification with the candidates, and membership in the parties that 
nominate the candidates. The term candidate identification is used here to mean that 
tuan guru think that particular candidates project their political ideals. The term also 
entails the belief that the candidate would be best in realizing his expectations. In the 
following case study, Tuan Guru Muhammad Bakhiet maintains that qualities such as 
probity and piousness are more important in a candidate than generosity, especially 
when it is politically motivated. 
Like Guru Bakeri, Guru Muhammad 
Bakhiet is young and popular. Born in 
1966, he is the head ofNurul Muhibbin, 
a complex encompassing a pesantren, 
~ 
an orphanage and a engajian in) 
Barabai, Hulu Sungai Tenga nsT) 
district. 31 While the pesantren hosts 
Interview with Guru Supian, Banjarmasin, 13 May 2008 
31 Interview with Guru Muhammad Bakhiet and Haris Fadilah, a junior staff in pesantren Nurul 
Muhibbien, Barabai, 31 May 2008 
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only around 900 students, his popularity is clearly demonstrated by his Monday 
night pengajian, to which approximately 5000 people come every week. 32 Unlike 
Guru Bakeri however, Guru Bakhiet is not political. He does mix with politicians and 
advise his followers to vote for Islamic parties, but he does not do this for service 
exchange. 33 In his teens he was an ideological supporter of PPP34 , the only Islamic 
party then, but recently his sympathy falls to PKS. He says that PKS now reminds 
him of PPP in the 1980s when ordinary people were willing to donate something for 
the party. 35 He also shares the impression that many Indonesians have about PKS, 
that its parliamentarians are relatively 'clean' and more educated than the other 
parties'. In HST, PKS increased its seats in the district's parliament from 1 in 1999 to 
6 in 2004. 36 
It was not a surprise that in 2005 Guru 
Bakhiet supported the gubernatorial 
candidates nominated by PKS 
coalition with PAN, Ismet Ahmad and 
Habib Aboe Bakar al-Habsyi. The 
avowed reason, as stated in a news 
report that was very likely prepared by 
the candidates' team, was that Ismet and 
Habib Aboe were a combination of 
professionalism and morality. 37 The two, he argued, would bring a better life for 
32 Interview with Haris Fadilah, Barabai, 31May2008. The compact disks sold every week by the 
students ofNurul Muhibbien shows that the number is not an exaggeration. 
33 Interview with Guru Bakhiet, Barabai, 30 May 2008; with Faqih Jurjani, the former chairman of 
PKS in HST district, Barabai, 29 May 2008; with Ilyas, the former chairman of PPP on HST district, 
Barabai, 2 June 2008 
34 In his second year of junior high school, Bakhiet decided to leave the school because a teacher 
frequently made jokes about PPP, for example, referring to it as the 'toilet party' not the 'ka'bah 
party' . Young Bakhiet took it as humiliating, so he went home and studied with his father in Barabai. 
He did not care that he only needed a year to finish his studies at that school. Apparently developments 
in the late 1970s, when pro-Islamic party people faced so much political pressure in various ways, 
influenced his thinking. 
35 Interview with Guru Muhammad Bakhiet Nurul Muhibbien, Barabai, 31 May 2008. 
36 Interview with Faqih Jurjani, Barabai, 29 May 2008. 
37 
'Guru Bakhit dan Guru Pamangkih Dukung Penuh Ismet-Habib', Banjarmasin Post, Kalimantan 
Post, Radar Banjarmasin, 6 June 2005. 
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South Kalimantan society and piousness in every aspect of life. 38 In my interview 
with him, he mentioned two other things. First, he believed that both candidates had 
clean reputations. "I know both of them, in public and private life," he stated, "as I 
know Rudy Ariffin". 39 This implies that he contended that Ismet was cleaner than 
Rudy. Second, he admitted that his deep respect for the descendants of the Prophet 
Muhammad40 was also at play. He supported the candidates because Aboe Bakar is a 
habib, and more importantly, a pious one. "I have known Habib Aboe since the 1999 
general elections, and I have observed closely how he performs his daily worship", 
said Guru Bakhiet. 41 Guru Bakhiet, in other words, appreciates the probity and 
piousness of his candidates. 
11.)~~k 
One could r the extent to which Guru Bakhiet knows the candidates and whether 
his comments reflect the reality or rather the images for electoral purposes. As 
mentioned in chapter two, in 2007, Ismet was charged with ~mark up in a 
construction project (the development of South Kalimantan hajj embarkation) but has 
not been tried. This project dates back to 2001, or four years before the gubernatorial 
pilkada was held, implicating several provincial officials. Moreover, there is a rumor 
among Banjarmasin journalists that would question the piousness of Habib Aboe. 
This habib has reportedly invited journalists to go to nightclubs, 42 which, if it is true, 
does not fit with the image of pious Muslims, at least in South Kalimantan. My own 
impression is that Guru Bakhiet indeed believed what he saw then in Ismet and Habib 
Aboe prior to the pilkada. He also said that he did not regret his decision to support 
the candidates back then in 2005. 43 
~~ ~ 
39 Interview with Guru Bakhiet, Barabai, 30 May 2008 ) O 
40 Guru Bakhiet is well known as close to the descendant7.I of Prophet Muhammad (Habaib). In his 
pengajian, there are always some habaib sitting beside him He practices the Alawiyyin 'tarekat' with 
his jemaah, that is wiridl ratib (holy sentences consistlof prayers, Qur'anic verses, and salawat) 
composed by habaib from the Alawy clan. Teachers who gave him the ijazah (an official permit) to 
practice it are habaib, some from Martapura and others from Surabaya. Young habaib studying in his l 
pesantren enjoy the privilege of free tuitio;i and book fees, the same as the orphans. It is not an 
exaggeration to say that the descendants 61 Prophet/ ave a special place in Guru Bakhiet's Nurul 
Muhibbien. ¥-i, e · 
41 Interview with Guru Bakhiet, Barabai, 1 0 Ma~ ... 3.Q.Qr 
42 Confidential interview with a j oumalist)3ilfij11I111asin, 14 May 2008 
43 Interview with Guru Bakhiet, Barabai, 30 May 2008 
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There is one important point that would appear to rule out money as Guru Bakhiet's 
primary motivation. Ismet and Habib Aboe did not give Nurul Muhibbin any 
donations during the pilkada campaign.44 In fact, Guru Bakhiet spent some of his 
own money on hosting and accompanying the candidates to meet some communities 
in Barabai. 45 Golkar' s candidates and Sjachriel Darham did donate five million 
rupiah each, 46 but Guru Bakhiet did not change his mind about supporting Ismet and 
Habib Aboe. 
Guru Bakhiet's pengajian overflowed (melube ) with so mdn~ ale and i). Female attendees [or 
participants] that many of them had to sit outside nggar Nuru Uhibbien. 
Membership in the nominating parties 
With the exception of Guru Bakeri, none of the tuan guru we have discussed are 
affiliated with political parties. In analyzing them, I contend that the judgments of 
tuan guru of the candidates are more important than the nominating parties. Even 
Guru Bakeri who had been affiliated with Golkar did not support the party's 
candidates because Sjachriel Darham was more generous than Golkar to his 
pesantren. However, in the 2005 gubernatorial elections, there were tuan guru whose 
membership in the nominating parties was important in driving their political choice. 
44 Interview with Guru Bakhiet, Barabai, 30 May 2008 
45 Interview with Guru Bakhiet, Barabai, 30 May 2008 
46 Interview with Guru Bakhiet, Barabai, 30 May 2008 
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Here it is assumed that a tuan guru's choice to follow the decision of his party 
regarding the nomination of particular candidates is because of his membership in 
that party. For the purpose of our discussion, I use case studies of Golkar and PKB 
(Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party) tuan guru. 
Golkar tuan guru: the case oi GJJI.1LAh.duss~uku.r 
----·- -
Golkar in South Kalimantan provides influential tuan guru positions in the Council 
of Advisers (Badan Penasehat) whose role is largely symbolic. Historically, Golkar 
was a vehicle designed by the New Order regime to co-opt different functional 
groups and to support the regime. Ulama were one of its targefsi, ecially those 
associated with Nahdlatul Ulama which remained politically op~sit1onist at least 
until the late 1970s. Many ulama became Golkar supporters to avoid political 
intimidation and to gain economic and political advantages. Wh!ile it was open to 
members from many different professional groups, Golkar consistently maintained its 
secular nature. Ulama in this party served as vote getters, not ideologues. 
Guru Abdussyukur (died March 2007) of Martapura was a good example of a Golkar 
tuan guru. Popularly known as Guru Syukur, he was a director of Pesantren 
Darussalam of Martapura, one of the oldest and most populous pesantren in South 
Kalimantan. Darussalam is the reason why Martapura has been known as the city of 
santri and ulama. Guru Syukur's siding with Golkar in the New Order period, 
together with some other tuan guru of Darussalam outraged Martapura society, most 
of whom were traditional PPP voters. 47 Golkar, in return, rewarded the pesantren 
with easy access to government resources. 48 Guru Syukur remained affiliated with 
this party until his death. He was clearly a loyal supporter of Golkar, unlike Guru 
Khalilurrahman, his colleague in Darussalam, who joined PKB in 1998, or Guru 
Bakeri who switched allegiance to Sjachriel. 
47 Interview with Gusti Jazuli, an adopted son of Guru Syukur and a PKB activist, Martapura, 20 May 
2008; with Guru Khalilurrahrnan, a colleague of Guru Syukur, Martapura, 19 May 2008; with Guru 
Ahmad Bakeri, Gambut, 24 May 2008. 
48 Interview with Guru Khalilurrahrnan, a colleague of Guru Syukur, Martapura, 19 May 2008. 
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Guru Syukur's loyalty to Golkar was further demonstrated in a ' claim battle' in local 
newspapers. Rudy ' s team attempted to use Guru S ukur to improve Rudy's 
popularity prior to the pilka.da. The facts are as fol o~ Ru y Ariffin was the former 
bupati in Banjar district who ran as the PPP guber ator..i.ai candidate. In June 2005, 
the month of the pilka.da, Rudy's team claimed in a local P)lperili~fUSypkur had 
declared his support for Rudy and c:i~d on others to £ so°' A:o'cordmg ~e news 
report, Guru Syukur had stated thpiay the openmg cere~of-MesJrO al-Karomah 
after its 24-billion-rupiah renovab~on 24 March 2005. 49 Three days later, a picture 
of Guru Syukur with Rudy, as the then Bupati of Banjar district, appeared in a report 
about Rudy ' s policy to provide free health insurance for ulama. 50 In this report, Guru 
Syukur's supposed declaration of support was mentioned again. A few days later, 
Guru Syukur 'struck back', stating it was not true that he had pledged political 
support for Rudy, and that the free health insurance policy was irhplemented a very 
long time ago. 51 Importantly, he also said that he had been with Golkar since the 
period of its establishment in the late 1960s and thus, in the 2005 pilkada, he would 
support Golkar' s candidates. Guru Syukur made this clarification to show which side 
he took, and that was Golkar, not Rudy or PPP. 
In analyzing the claim and its clarification, one might ask, who was wrong: Guru 
Syukur or Rudy's team? The news report indicated that it quoted Guru Syukur's own 
words, not a paraphrased sentence, let alone someone else's statement. A member of 
Rudy's team, Habib Ali, said that Guru Syukur did state his political support for 
Rudy but because Golkar put political pressure on him, he made the clarification. 52 I 
could not confirm whether Habib Ali was present at that time or not, nor could I 
confirm the existence of political pressure by Golkar. However, it is reasonable to 
think that Habib Ali might be biased given the fact that he was an overt supporter of 
49 
'Rudy Ariffin dan Sejarah Mesjid al-Karomah Martapura', Kalimantan Post, 3 June 2005 
50 
'Rudy Berikan Asuransi Kesehatan Gratis kepada Ulama', Kalimantan Post and Radar 
Banjarmasin, 6 June 2005 
I 
51 This means that he admitted that the free health insurance was true, not a lie while implying the / ":J'rrt(i • 
giver, namely Rudy Ariffin, was not sincere (ikhlas) because he exploited it for pol~tical purposes. \ <.,, y 
52 Interview with Habib Ali, Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008 
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Rudy. 53 Another source, who can justifiably act as a~ Gusti Jazuli, Q.,~-' 
an adopted son of Guru Syukur, disputed Habib Ali's statement. He said that Guru 
Syukur would have not made such a public statement because it was not his style. 54 
He was not there, however, when Guru Syukur was said to have made such a 
statement. Interestingly, he was the chairman of PKB in the Banjar district which 
nominated Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan. Finally, Guru Khalilurrahman, a senior PKB 
ulama, a colleague of Guru Syukur in Pesantren Darussalam, and who attended the 
opening ceremony the news report referred to, testified that Guru Syukur did not 
make such a statement. 55 What he did say, according to Guru Khalil, was to express 
gratitude to Rudy for the renovation of Mesjid al-Karomah which would have not 
been accomplished without his willingness to use the district budget (Anggaran 
Daerah) in his capacity as Bupati (district head). I tend to believe Guru Khalil's 
testimony as the truth because not only he was present in the ceremony but also 
because of the fact that he was from PKB. 
However, the question as to who told the truth or who fabricated a story cannot 
change one undisputable fact Guru Syukur supported Golkar and its candidates, as 
he had consistently in the past. And, if we want to find out his motivation for 
supporting the Gusti Iskandar-Hafiz Anshari team, Golkar's nominees in the 
gubernatorial elections, it is reasonable to argue that it was his affiliation with Golkar 
that motivated him. 
53 During my interview with him, Habib Ali made some statements that make me cautious in judging I CV J ~ 1,.-t. 
the truth of what he states. V-...<-c. 
54 Interview with Gusti Jazuli, Martapura, 20 May 2008. ~ 
55 Interview with Guru Khalilurrahman, Martapura, 19 May 2008 
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P KB tuan guru: the case of Guru Khalilurrahman 
In 2005, Guru Khal\lurrahman was the chairman of the Dewan Syura in the South 
Kalimantan PKB, ~e<ffon with the highest authority within the party. 56 He is the 
colleague of Guru Abdussyukur mentioned above. He has a long political career and 
has been affiliated with three different parties: Nahdlatul Ulama, Golkar and PKB. In 
56 All information in this paragraph is based on my interview with Guru Khalilurrahman in Martapura, 
Banjar district, on 19 May 2008. 
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the 1971 general elections, he campaigned for NU and became a candidate ® 
regional assembly in Banjar district. However, being an NU activist and, at the same 
time, a public servant, in the 1970s was not easy, especially because of the imposition 
of the 'mono-loyalty' ideology. That is, a public servant had to be loyal to the 
government which was controlled by Golkar. Affiliation with other political parties 
was considered as breaking this loyalty, and therefore a public servant had to choose 
between continuing to work for the government, or resigning and working for his 
preferred party. The amalgamation of NU and other Islamic parties to form PPP in 
1973 gave Guru Khalilurrahman a second reason to join Golkar, the same decision 
taken by his colleagues in Pesantren Darussalam. He said that their intention to join 
Golkar was to develop the pesantren. He then served as a district parliamentarian for 
Golkar for two periods (1982-1992) but had no position in the Golkar board. In 1992, 
Guru Khalilurrahman f retired early from the public service, after ~hich he felt free 
from any obligation' to support Golkar. In 1998, he helped to establish PKB in 
Martapura, which he then represented in the DPR (1999-2004). He did not 
specifically mention his reasons for joining PKB. However, I believe there are two 
main reasons. First, he felt that PKB as a party fitted his politics as a nahdliyyin more 
than Golkar, because Nahdlatul Ulama facilitated the creation of PKB. Second, since 
PKB was newly created in 1998, joining it guaranteed him an important position 
within the party. lf-he-&tt%~o~~ PPP, which also appealed to NU followers, he ) 
would have had to compete with 
the older activists there, and his 
association m the past with 
Golkar, the traditional enemy of 
PPP in Martapura and South 
Kalimantan, would have made this 
challenging for him. Thus the 
reasons appear to be both 
ideological and political. 
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What clearly motivated Guru Khalilurrahman during the pilkada was the intention to 
support PKB's choice of candidate. Rosehan NB, the candidate, was the party's 
chairman and he had good relations with the rest of the board. There was no divisive 
friction in the provincial board of PKB: Rosehan's team was solid. Politically, 
pairing the candidates of PKB and PPP was promising since both the parties were (. 
closely associated with NU followers who comprised a very large portion of the 





In the age of political freedom, ulama engage in political activity to seek 
advancement as well as to manifest political ideals. Their popularity and influence 
over their pupils and followers are commodities for trading with politicians, if they 
wish to use them. Ulama can benefit from donations and various f~cilities offered by 
the candidates in exchange for their masses' votes. "Why reject opportunities when 
they come to you", i~e question beating around in their minds. Indeed, 
some of the ulama are self-sufficient and can manage to provide facilities on their 
own, but gaining them without ~£much effort is seen by many as not a bad idea. 
Making a statement of support or speaking in a couple of campaign events is not that 
difficult. Besides, the community at large may also benefit either directly or 
indirectly from this 'cooperation'. Ulama deal with politicians who desperately need 
A Cfvek_ 
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popular support without whi:_h th~bitions . Ulama understand Ox,f" . 
this and act accordingly. The case studies above show us that tuan guru campaigned 
for the gubernatorial candidates who bought their pesantren a tractor or a water tank, 
or who would could off er the chance of a promising career in the future. 
a \-.J.e_ 
However, some tuan guru put material rewards to.J'eside and stood up for their 
political ideals. They supported those candidates whom they believed possessed the 
qualities needed to be good and successful leaders, but who did not necessarily have 
abundant money. The tuan guru spent their own money, not to mention their precious 




contribution to society as not limited to teaching and preaching only, but to help elect 
responsible and committed leaders as well. They were able to withstand the 
temptation of easy funds, and maybe positions, offered by other candidates. 
Looking at the big picture, the trends are more of continuity rather than of change 
from the practices in the New Order period. Kiai Musta'in Romly of Jombang sided 
with Golkar in the mid 1970s for similar rea@ Guru Bakeri, namely exchanging 
services. 57 On the other hand, many NU kiais endured political intimidation and kept 
supporting PPP at least until the early 1980s. The only difference is perhaps that 
political freedom makes the second attitude, i.e. supporting politicians who fit with 
tuan guru's political ideals, more common. Now, with the absence of state 
intimidation, the choices are between pragmatism and idealism. The 2005 
gubernatorial pilkada in South Kalimantan suggests that idealism can motivate tuan 
( 
guru, if they are self-sufficient (that is, not reliant on honoratia from political 
candidates) and do not have political ambitions. The tuan guru~. <J~ 
their candidates. They could also be disappointed if the candidates are unable to 
--------realize their ideals after being in power. Nevertheless, their appreciation of values is a 
precious possession that could inspire the society or next generation . 
With the continued importance of ulama as vote getters, we will see the two 
motivations and political attitudes prevailing. Only the extent to which each of them 
move ulama will fluctuate according to the political environment. 
57 For more on Kiai Musta'in Romly and his pesantren, tarekat and politics in the 1970s and 1980s, 
see En dang Turmudi, Struggling for the Ummah, changing leadership roles of Kiai in Jombang, East 
Java, Doctoral Thesis at the Department of Sociology, the Australian National University, (Canberra: 
ANU E Press 1996); Sukamto, Kepemimpinan Kiai dalam Pesantren, (Jakarta: Pustaka LP3ES, 1999); 
and Chapter 5 of Martin van Bruinessen, NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa dan Pencarian Wacana 







Political Players and Self Interested Leaders? 
Tuan Guru as Campaigners 
The role of ulama in elections for regional heads varies from place to place. In the 
2005 gubernatorial pilkada in South Kalimantan, tuan guru acted as campaigners, 
not as candidates or political playmakers. Ben Hillman's observation (2005) 
succinctly describes their function as 'useful assistants' to mobilise support and to 
make the candidates' political performances lively. 1 Tuan guru, of course, were 
not the only people the candidates counted on for mobilisation. 
This chapter discusses the various activities of tuan guru to help the campaigns of 
their candidates. It shows the differences in terms of the timing aµd frequency of 
tuan guru involvement. I conclude that the tuan guru are rational and active 
political players who calculate the benefit and harm of participating in campaigns. 
Further, I look at the rewards given to tua11._ guru by the candidates and then 
questionl~~\ :re the ultimate beneficia£~he tuan guru and their families or 
the broa~,;viuslim community. In effect, I seek to evaluate whether the tuan 
guru act pnmarily out of self interest, or in the interests of the communities they 
represent, as they themselves would argue. 
Nahdlatul Ulama provides examples of kiai who enriched themselves and also 
kiai who used the wealth gained from politics for advancement of the institutions 
or communities that they led. In his discussion about corruption within NU in the 
1950s, Fealy (1998) cited the example of Kiai Munir Abisudjak, who lived a 
lavish lifestyle while responsible for managing many of NU's assets . According 
to Fealy, Kiai Munir later sold off many of the organisation's assets or transferred 
them into his private possessions, which led NU members to depict him as 'the 




kiai who was ruined by money'. 2 The Kiai Munir case shows that Islamic 
scholars can act in a self-interested way. In contrast, other accounts suggest that 
kiai distribute money that they raise for scholarships, 3 for their students who 
establish new pesantren, 4 and primarily, for their pesantren' s development. 5 In 
such cases, ulama are community-oriented people. 
In this chapter, I argue that the rewards resulting from tuan guru involvement in 
the pilkada campaign benefited both tuan guru and their institutions. Thus, the 
tuan guru do not act purely out of self interest. I must also say that this study 
represents a preliminary examination of these issues, and therefore, it is not 
comprehensive. Nonetheless, I believe that the data provided does offer some 
initial information that will hopefully spur deeper research on this issue. 
The activities of tuan guru in campaign 
In general, tuan guru engaged in three types of activities to help their candidates. 
To begin with, they participated actively in campaign events by leading prayers or 
giving talks. Secondly, they encouraged their pupils, outside official campaign 
events, to vote for their candidates. Finally, they supported the candidates by 
making statements of support or by lobbying other leaders to join the effort. 
However, not every tuan guru undertook all three activities during the pilkada 
campaign. Some participated in campaign events but did not make any statement 
of support in newspapers, for instance. Others supported particular candidates 
personally, but at the same time, recommended their neighbours elect candidates 
whom they perceived to be the most de.c.en.t-au.d_generous, even if that was 
someone different from the candidate of the tuan guru. Moreover, some tuan guru 
2 Greg Fealy, Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: a History ofNahdlatul Ulama, 1952-1967, Ph. D 
Thesis, Department of History, Monash University, 1998, pp. 197-8 
3 A Banjarese tuan guru who serves in the South Kalimantan regional assembly allocates around 
40 million rupiah to support an Islamic school in his neighbourhood. Interview with Guru Husni 
Nurin, Banjarmasin, 8 May 2008 
4 A Tasikmalayan kiai for instance, practices this. A discussion with Greg Fealy, Canberra, 4 
February 2009 
5 A discussion with Nabiela Naily whose family owns a pesantren in East Java, June 2008. The 
case of Kiai Musta'in Rornly who used donations from Jakarta politicians in 1963 for erecting a 
university in his pesantren discussed in chapter one is also a good example. 
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limited the campaign events that they attended, for example, to only those in their 
own locality. Furthermore, some tuan guru declined to appear in 'open' campaign 
functions such as large rallies or parades, although they diligently participated in 
the 'closed' campaign. 
The 'open' campaign refers to the campaign held between the 13th and 26th June 
2005. The 'closed' campaign refers to the campaign events before that. The 
official term for the open campaign was 'the campaign' (kampanye) and for the 
closed campaign, 'the socialisation' (sosialisasi) . Both periods consisted of 
announcing candidacies, making promises and attracting the voters through 
various means. What made sosialisasi different from kampanye, according to the 
electoral commission in South Kalimantan, was the absence of any mention of a 
candidate's number on the ballot (nomor urut ca/on) and of any invitation to vote 
(see SK KPUD No: 008 2005; Effendy 2006, p. 151). Another difference is in the 
number of people involved: in the kampanye, thousands of people1were mobilised 
to attend campaign events, which were thus often a show of power, while 
sosialisasi events consisted of small gatherings with particular communities or 
groups of people. I use 'closed' and 'open' campaigns interchangeably with 
'sosialisasi' and 'kampanye ' because some tuan guru used them when explaining 
their involvement. In reality, the candidates used every chance to invite people to 
vote for them although in the sosialisasi phase they would employ indirect 
language. Thus, instead of saying 'please, vote for us', they would say 'please, 
remember us when you make your vote' .6 In practice, there was little substantial 
difference between the sosialisasi and kampanye periods of the campaign. 
In order to illustrate how individual tuan guru had their own particular ways of 
supporting the candidates, I give below a number of examples from campaigns of 
four teams of candidates. After that, I will explain the reasons behind the different 
approaches in a separate section. 
6 Interview with two members of the Rudy and Rosehan campaign team, Banjannasin, 3 and 17 
May 2008. This was a typical way of avoiding the sanction from the Panitia Pengawas Daerah 
(Panwasda, an official but ad hoc committee that monitored the conduct of the pilkada). 
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The supporters of Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan NB (the 2R team) 
Habib Ali Haidar al-Kaff represents a highly active tuan guru campaigner. Not 
only did he participate throughout Rudy and Rosehan's open campaign in June 
2005, he also accompanied Rudy for four months of sosialisasi in thirteen 
districts. 7 He gave speeches containing a combination of religious and social 
concerns such as the widespread nature of corruption, while slipping in praise for 
Rudy and Rosehan, who were known as the 2R team because of the combination 
of their first initials. 8 For instance, he said jokingly that '2R' also stands for 
Rahman and Rahiem, two names of God meaning respectively the Lord of Mercy 
and the Giver ofMercy.9 
Importantly, Habib Ali served as a counter balance to the Ismet Ahmad and Habib 
Aboe team (the 2U team) who, as discussed in chapter two, invited many habaib 
to their campaign events or to join their campaign team. The physical appearance 
of Habib Ali in Rudy's campaigns was a statement: support from the descendants 
of Prophet Muhammad was not the monopoly of the 2U team. 
Guru Supian, the then Rais Syuriah (head of the ulama council) of the 
Banjarmasin branch of Nahdlatul Ulama, was another campaigner for Rudy and 
Rosehan. In contrast to Habib Ali, he is an example of a tuan guru who was 
cautious in his involvement in the pilkada campaign. He rejected three other 
campaign teams that approached him and his participation in Rudy's campaign 
was very limited. He talked only at two pengajian intended as sosialisasi events 
for the 2R team in Tambarangan (Tapin district) and Gadung (HST district) 10, 
both of which were far away from his home. He claimed, however, that he had 
several friends in those areas, 11 which means that he did not speak to an audience 
7 Inteiview with Habib Ali Haidar, Banjannasin, 17 May 2008; also, with Jamhuri, 3 May 2008. 
Habib Ali ' s active participation is recorded for example in 'Kampanye Pertama Rudy Ariffin-
Rosehan NB di Amuntai, Ribuan Massa Mengelu-elukannya' , Banjarmasin Post, 16 June 2005; 
'2R 'Goncang' Batola, Siap Membawa Perubahan di Kalsel', Kalimantan Post, 17 June 2005; 
'Rudy-Rosehan Bawa Kalsel Berakhlak Qur'ani', Kalimantan Post, 18 June 2005. 
8 Inteiview with Habib Ali Haidar, Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008 
9 
'2R Hadirkan Ungu Band, pagi ini di stadion mini Bartjarbaru', Radar Banjarmasin, 23 June 
2005 
10 Inteiview with Guru Supian, Banjarmasin, 13 May 2008 
11 Inteiview with Guru Supian, Banjarmasin, 13 May 2008 
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of complete strangers. Finally, for someone whose nominees won the pilkada, he 
did not look very enthusiastic when recounting his part in the victorious story to 
me. 
The supporter of lsmet Ahmad and Habib Aboe Bakar 
Guru Muhammad Bakhiet, the head of Nurul Muhibbin, Barabai, is a very good 
example of a tuan guru who was involved in many aspects of the closed 
campaign but did not participate in the open campaign. He accompanied Ismet 
and Habib Aboe socializing their candidacies in his own town. 12 This means he 
showed up with his candidates in the area where his pupils resided. He warmly 
hosted the candidates in his home while they were in Barabai. This was not a new 
practice as Habib Aboe Bakar had, since 1999, always stayed there if he had a 
campaign function in Barabai .13 This consistent gesture carried an important 
message for Guru Bakhiet's followers: their tuan guru continued to support the 
2U team despite the approaches of other candidates. Moreover, Guru Bakhiet 
gave an interview to a journalist who then reported him swearing before God to 
'fully support the ulama-umara team' and giving justifications for that. 14 In 
addition, before this interview took place, he lobbied the head of Pesantren Ibnul 
Amin, where he had studied three years previously, to support his candidates. 
Confident of getting his teacher's support, he mentioned in the interview that the 
tuan guru joined him in backing the Ismet-Habib Aboe team.15 
Despite all of his supportive gestures, Guru Bakhiet did not participate in the open 
campaign of the 2U team in Barabai . He was neither cautious like Guru Supian, 
nor was he fully involved like Habib Ali. Guru Bakhiet's place was somewhere in 
12 Interview with Guru Muhammad Bakhiet, Barabai, 31 May 2008 
13 That is, when Habib Aboe Bakar ran as a national legislative candidate for PKS. Interview with 
Guru Muhammad Bakhiet, Barabai, 31 May 2008. Although other pairs of candidates also visited 
Guru Bakhiet, the fact that Habib Aboe kept coming and sometimes stayed over night in Nurul 
Muhibbien ~peaks something. That is, Habib Aboe has a prior cultivated relationship with this 
tu an guru and maintained It very well to the 2005 gubernatorial pilkada. 
14 The report appeared in three different papers on the same day indicating that the space 
containing it had been bought. See Kalimantan Post, Banjarmasin Post, and Radar Banjarmasin, 
'Guru Bakhit dan Guru Pamangkih Dukung Ismet-Habib', 6 June 2005. 
15 The tuan guru of Ibnul Amin did not confirm this claim but he did not rebut it publicly either. It 
is likely that the teacher-student relationship prevented the controversy from becoming public. 
Interview with Guru H. Mukhtar Salman of Peinangkih, HST district, 30 May 2008. 
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between those tuan guru. 
The supporters of Gusti Iskandar and Hafiz Anshary ( Golkar' s nominees) 
Guru Abdussyukur was a typical elderly tuan guru who was affiliated with a 
political party. He participated only in the functions held in his district, Banjar. As 
reported by the Kalimantan Post, Guru Syukur led the opening prayer signaling 
the start of the open campaign.16 In the other field reports of the Iskandar-Hafiz 
team's campaign, there was no mention of him. 17 It is highly unlikely that a 
journalist would omit a big name like his from a report should he have been 
present. Guru Khalilurrahman and Guru Hamdan Khalid of Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa (PKB) took a similar approach to him on this matter; they only attended 
the open campaign conducted in their respective areas, Martapura and Amuntai. 18 
As a Golkar affiliated tuan guru, Guru Syukur participated in 1Golkar's general 
meetings and supported its political decisions regarding the pilkada. For example, 
prior to the open campaign period, on 5 June he delivered a speech at a large 
Golkar convention urging the consolidation of the party machinery in the run-up 
to the pilkada. 19 In the speech, he asserted his ongoing loyalty to Golkar and 
urged the party officials and cadres to work together so that Golkar' s nominees 
would achieve victory. 20 On another occasion, Guru Syukur spoke out about the 
side he took in this pilkada. The event I refer to here is the one in which Guru 
Syukur called a press conference to clarify news reports depicting him giving 
backing to other candidates, and therefore, walking away from Golkar' s 
nominees. I have described this controversy at length in the chapter three. Suffice 
16 
'Massa Kampanye Iskandar-Hafiz Lampaui Target, Tampil Sepanggung Cabup Banjar' , 
Kalimantan Post, 16 June 2005 
17 For instance, 'Kampanye Hari Pertama: Iskandar-Hafiz 'Gebrak' Banjannasin', Kalimantan 
Post, 15 June 2005; 'Pendidikan Tak Gratis, Iskandar akan Mundur', Kalimantan Post, 17 June 
2005 on campaign functions in HSS and Tapin districts; 'Gusti Iskandar dan Hadad Alwi Pukau 
Hulu Sungai', Banjarmasin Post, 24 June 2005 and 'Puluhan Ribu Massa Iskandar-Hafiz 
Bershalawat, Hadad Alwi Doakan Pendidikan Gratis Bisa Terkabul', Barito Post, 24 June 2005 
on functions in three other districts: HSU, Balangan and Tabalong. 
18 Interview with Guru Khalilurrahman, Martapura, 19 May 2008; Interview with Guru Hamdan 
Khalid, Amuntai, 3 June 2008. Guru Hamdan's participation in the Amuntai 2R open campaign 
was recorded in 'Kampanye Pertama Rudy Ariffin-Rosehan NB di Amuntai, Ribuan Massa 
Mengelu-elukannya', Banjarmasin Post, 16 June 2005. 
19 As reported in 'Sejurnlah Ulama Banjar Imbau Dukung Calon Golkar, Ribuan Kader di Tanbu 
Bertekad Menangkan Pilkada', Kalimantan Post, 6 June 2005. 
20 
'Sejurnlah Ulama Banjar Imbau Dukung Calon Golkar' , Kalimantan Post, 6 June 2005 
to say here that Guru Syukur was consistent in his political choices and denied the 
claim made by the other candidates that he had supported them. The fact that he 
made this public is a form of supportive activities. While the public had known 
about Guru Syukur' s siding with Golkar for a long time, the controversy provided 
him with an opportunity to renew, or rather, reassert his political consistency. 
Another campaigner for the Iskandar and Hafiz team was Guru Nanang Gayam 
(pseudonym). "uru Nanang was a contrast to Guru Syukur, even though they 
su pt>sedl~orted the same gubernatorial candidates. He was not a Golkar 
activist, although as a public servant working in the New Order period he used to 
vote for Golkar. 21 His involvement in the pilkada campaign was more in terms of 
providing services rather than being driven by party identification like Guru 
Syukur. One indication of this was that he felt disappointed when receiving only 
two envelopes, containing his honoraria, for talking on three occasions at 
sosialisasi events. 22 
Guru Nanang advised his neighbors to support the Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan 
team. This is definitely not the kind of attitude one would expect from a 
supporter, or someone who owed a debt of gratitude. He argued that the 2R 
candidates made a real contribution, in the form of donations, to the langgar and 
the Islamic kindergarten (TK Al-Qur'an) in the neighborhood. 23 It is wrong 
however, to conclude that this tuan guru was inconsistent or had no principles. In 
fact, he had and that was 'voting for those who did real favors or made 
contributions to you'. 24 As the Golkar nominees did nothing in particular for this 
neighborhood, he felt it was wrong to ask the residents to vote for them. 25 
21 Interview with Guru Nanang Gayam, Banjar District, 9 June, 2008 
22 His disappointment was understandable since normally every speaker at such a campaign event 
was given a honorarium for each 'service'. However, he claimed that he helped Iskandar and 
Hafiz, not the other candidates, because Hafiz had shared information with him about a small 
grant from Golkar for his study, many years earlier. In other words, Guru Nanang felt indebted to 
Hafiz. This claim, in my opinion, is weak. Unlike Guru Supian who was approached by four 
teams, Guru Nanang was only invited by the Iskandar and Hafiz team. Thus Guru Nanang was not 
in a position to select the most favorite team, but only whether he wanted to participate or not. 
Interview with Guru Nanang Gayam, Banjar District, 30 April and 9 June 2008 
23 Guru Nanang told me that Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan donated 2.5 million rupiah each. Interview 
with Guru Nanang Gayam, Banjar District, 9 June, 2008 
24 Interview with Guru Nanang Gayam, Banjar District, 9 June, 2008 
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The supporters of Sjachriel Darham 
Guru Ahmad Bakeri was the most widely known tuan gu,ru supporter of Sjachriel 
Darham. He left Golkar, in which he used to be a member of the council of 
advisers, after the party refused to nominate Sjachriel as its gubernatorial 
candidate. As discussed in chapter three, Sjachriel had done a lot for his Pesantren 
and Guru Bakeri appeared to understand that his interests would be better served 
by Sjachriel than Golkar. Guru Bakeri also thought that his position in Golkar as 
an adviser was useless, because his attempt to lobby the Golkar leader, H. 
Sulaiman HB to nominate Sjachriel was denied. 26 
Guru Bakeri acted as the official campaigner attending all of Sjachriel's eight 
open campaign functions in June 2005. He delivered religious sermons just as 
Habib Ali did for Rudy and Rosehan's campaign. 27 Sjachriel's functions put a 
heavy emphasis on Guru Bakeri's sermons, which invariably contained messages 
to vote for Sjachriel. Moreover, Guru Bakeri also sent similar messages when he 
lectured in his weekly pengajian. This demonstrated his staunch support for 
Sjachriel. Angered by this, the other teams reported him to the Panwas pilkada 
(the official b~committee monitoring the conduct of the pilkada) for 
violating a rule, i.e. campaigning outside the official schedule. 28 Guru Bakeri was 
reprimanded by the head of the Panwas pilkada. 29 There were no further protests 
after that, but his students in al-Mursyidul Amin knew very well that their kiai 
wanted them to vote for Sjachriel. He told them to do so. 30 
26 Interview with Guru Bakeri, Banjar District, 24 May 2008. 
27 Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Banjar District, 24 May 2008. News reports which 
mentioned Guru Bakeri's participation in Sjahriel campaign functions include 'Guru Bakeri 'Blak~ 
blakan'Dukung Sjahriel', Kalimantan Post, 15 June 2005; 'lskandar di Banjarmasin, Sjachriel di 
Banjarbaru, Rudy di Amuntai, lsmet di Kotabaru, Menghadirkan H Leman dan Kustan Basri', 
Radar Banjarmasin, 15 June 2005; 'Sjahriel-Iskandar di Dua Tempat, Menurunkan KH Akhmad 
Bakri', Radar Banjarmasin, 15 June 2005; and 'Orasi dan Hiburan', Banjarmasin Post, 18 June 
2005. 
28 This is one of a number of violations committed by the Sjahriel-Aidi team during the pilkada 
campaign. See 'lskandar-Hafiz Paling Rajin Kampanye, Sjahriel-Aidi Paling 'Malas' Kampanye', 
Radar Banjarmasin, 28 June 2005 
29 Interview with Radin Muhjad, the head of South Kalimantan Panwasda in 2005, Banjarmasin, 
14May 2008 
30 Interview with Fakhriadi, Banjar District, 24 May 2008. 
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Tuan guru calculations 
The above examples clearly show that tuan guru differed when helping their 
candidates. They all participated in election campaigns, but their enthusiasm and 
the commitment, as shown by how often they participated and the way they 
promoted the candidates, varied markedly. Here, I offer some explanations for the 
different approaches of tuan guru. 
First, tuan guru were aware of the uneasiness and to a lesser extent, disapproval, 
of some Muslims regarding the involvement of the ulama in politics. They 
personally were probably aware of the arguments against their becoming 
involved. However, since the involvement of tuan guru in electoral campaigns 
was not unprecedented, and because some tuan guru saw the pilkada as a political 
or economic opportunity, they jumped in anyway. However, to deal with the 
fallout of this disapproval, they limited the kind of events they participated in and 
thus, minimized the exposure of their involvement. The best example of this is 
Guru Supian who agreed to speak only in the closed campaign of the Rudy and 
Rosehan team held out of town. To a lesser degree, we can also see this in the 
case of Guru Bakhiet who did not attend the open campaign of the Ismet and 
Habib Aboe team, although he made supportive efforts in the closed campaign 
before that. The open campaign allows a greater exposure because thousands of 
people attend it and it gets media coverage. It would be very difficult to control 
what people think or what media say about the appearance of a tuan guru. 
On the other hand, if tuan guru thought that their involvement was entirely 
justifiable,31 they did not mind the exposure. It is even possible that they were 
happy with the media coverage. Guru Bakeri, as discussed in chapter three, felt 
that his participation in Sjachriel's campaign was an observance of a moral 
31 Concerning the criticism towards the involvement of the ulama in politics, the tuan guru tzy to 
be patient but sometimes they_~QIDJllainJQ.p. Guru Bakeri said, for instance, "Many people dianot V~ 
kiiow how difficult was it to develop a pesantren in the 1980s when electricity and the road had 
not reached this village". This was regarding his decision to join Golkar, which controlled the 
govemmen!, that he expected- to..provide the infrastrucfure7"1J<rck-ilr lnee 1glities. Interview with cf>' Gt.v-...... r · 
Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Banjar District, 24 May 2008 
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obligation, which is to help a person who had done him favours. 32 This 
explanation also applies for Guru Syukur whose affiliation with Golkar was 
f?J-e~ for the development of Pesantren Darussalam. 33 For them, participating 
in the open campaign was not something to be avoided. They were not afraid of 
making bold statements in such events either. For instance, Guru Bakeri once 
stated, "unlike some other ulama who concealed their choices in the pilkada or 
were hypocrites, I am frank about mine and that is to vote for Sjachriel". 34 Guru 
Syukur, on the other hand, repeatedly declared his loyalty to Golkar on various 
occasions duringpilkada time. ............... ____ _ 
/ krce1ud "? 
Moreover, if the tuan guru were natural poli~cians or wanted to have political 
careers in the future, their involvement was imore than just attending the open 
campaign. Habib Ali Haidar al-Kaff, the above noted most diligent tuan guru 
campaigner, was a good example of this. He and another tuan guru, Guru Husni 
Nurin who is a rising PKB politician, hardly missed any sosialisasi function of 
the Rudy and Rosehan team as well. The motivation of Habib Ali to support 
Rudy, I argued in chapter three, was in expectation of political advancements that 
he did not get from PKS. On the other hand, Guru Husni took over the position of 
Rosehan in the provincial parliament when the latter was elected as the deputy 
governor. 35 
But if the tuan guru were elderly and had no more political ambition, they would 
not be bothered to become involved too much in the campaign. Attending the 
open campaign of their candidates in their respective areas was enough to show 
their support. Guru Hamdan Khalid of Amuntai and Guru Khalilurrahman of 
Martapura are examples of this. In 2005, Guru Hamdan was 69 years old, the Rais 
Syuriah of the South Kalimantan branch of Nahdlatul Ulama, and was not 
32 He cites a Qur'anic verse reads, "Shall the reward of good be anything but good". Interview 
with Ustadz Abdurrahman, a colleague of Gum Bakeri, Banjarbam, 22 May 2008; with Ustadz 
Husni Nurin, a preacher, Banjarmasin, 8 May 2008. 
33 Interview with Gum Khalilurrahman, Martapura, 19 May 2008; with Gusti Jazuli, Martapura, 
20 June 2008 
34.Gum Bakeri 'Blak-blakan' Dukung Sjachriel', Kalimantan Post, 15 June 2005. What he meant 
by hypocrisy, seemingly, was the warm response of tuan guru to every candidate approaching 
them, as if they supported the candidate. 
35 Interview with Ustadz Husni Nurin, a preacher, Banjarmasin, 8 May 2008. 
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interested in becoming an MP. 36 Similarly, Guru Khalilurrahman was in his mid-
sixties, had just finished his service as a PKB national parliamentarian in 2004 
and was in charge of the Dewan Syuriah of the South Kalimantan branch of PKB 
until 2007.37 These tuan guru had occupied the positions that many ulama 
politicians would like to reach. Victory in the pilkada was not like a big fish that 
they would work hard to catch. 
Finally, when a tuan guru campaigned for honoraria and thought that his 
candidates did not appreciate his work, it was not surprising that his personal 
choice contradicted his advice to his community, as in the case of Guru Nanang 
Gayam. He, to recap, campaigned for Iskandar and Hafiz but told his neighbours 
to vote for Rudy and Rosehan - a good example of pragmatism. 
Tuan guru campaigners had their own ideals and ambitions and they acted 
accordingly . They agreed to become involved in the pilkada Campaign to help 
particular candidates but set their own boundaries. They made conscious choices 
about how and when they showed political support. They made calculations just 
like their candidates. 
Who benefited? 
What, then, did tuan guru get out of their involvement in the pilkada campaign? 
Were tuan guru the only beneficiaries of the gains or did the institutions that they 
led, pesantren or pengajian, enjoy the benefits as well? I seek to answer these 
questions here, in the final part of this chapter. 
Before proceeding to the issue of gains, a brief discussion of{ ontrasting pictures 
of ulama is necessary. Some scholars are skeptical t~ when ulama generate 
money frotph politicians or political involvement, the~~d use it for their 
communite ording to this view, ulama would enrich themselves and spend 
the money on a opulent lifestyle. Indeed, as the case of Kiai Munir Abisudjak 
mentioned earlier suggests, ulama could be self-interested. However, one can also 
36 Interview with Guru Hamdan Khalid, Amuntai, 3 June 2008 
37 Interview with Guru Khalilurrahman, Martapura, 19 May 2008 
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find abundant evidence whic1#otherwise. 38 That is, ulama are community-
oriented, channeling the money they receive from various sources, including 
politics, to the needy or to the improvement of the quality of the ummah, m 
general. 
The limited scope of this study prevents me from generalizing whether tuan guru 
properly use or abuse the money they receive from politicians. What this study 
does do, however, is illustrate that the involvement of tuan guru in the pilkada 
campaign benefited themselves as well as their institutions. We can see this from 
the rewards given by the candidates. In other words, this study suggests that tuan 
guru, as shown in the 2005 pilka.da, cannot be categorised simply as self-
interested people. However, it is also clear that the money given to them, as 
honoraria, very likely went into their own pockets because it was intended that 
this be so. On the other hand, we do not know for sure what they did with it in 
their own private arrangements. 
During the 2005 gubernatorial pilka.da campaign, the candidates rewarded both 
the individual tuan guru and their institutions, if they had one. Rewards for the 
individuals were two in kind: honoraria and 'bonuses'. The bonuses I mean here 
are additional gifts donated by candidates after they won the pilka.da. It is worth 
noting that some rewards were of an individualistic nature so that they could not 
be directly enjoyed by others. Moreover, the rewards for institutions were 
normally either untied donations or specific development assistance. 
Honoraria 
Candidates provided honoraria for tuan guru campaigners as they did for other 
groups of people who helped their campaign, such as the entertainers. This, as 
noted in chapter three, was simply following a normal practice when inviting a 
tuan guru for religious services. The honoraria may not be intended as direct 
payment for the time, the popularity and the skills of tuan guru. Nonetheless, 
38 Generally, ulama who have Islamic schools and seek funding from politics fall into this 
category. For example, Kiai Musta'inRomli ofDarul Ulum, Jombang who aligned with Golkar in 
the 1970s that generously donated for his pesantren. Many other NU kiai resembled him in siding 




giving honoraria is a practical way of appreciating people's service, which has an 
economic element. 
The amount of honoraria varied and it seemed that the fame of the tuan guru was 
taken into consideration to determine it. A-not-so-popular-preacher like Guru 
Nanang Gayam, for instance, only received a hundred thousand rupiah per 
event. 39 In contrast, Sjachriel' s team, which held eight functions 40 during the 
official campaign period, provided ten million rupiah for the famous Guru Ahmad 
Bakeri. 41 That means a per function honorarium to Guru Bakeri of one and a 
quarter million rupiah or twelve times the honorarium of Guru Nanang. 
Having mentioned this, there is nothing wrong with tuan guru receiving honoraria 
for religious services, let alone from political involvement. There is no teaching 
that obliges or recommends them to reject payment for dispensing religious 
services. In fact, they are allowed to use _p.o.rtLons of endowment (waqaf), if they 
are trusted to manage it, for basic an~pending especially when they 
cannot work because of taking care of the endowment. They would consider that 
as God's blessing (barakah) upon them for carrying out the propagation of His 
commands. In other words, making money out of religious service is acceptable, 
not condemned. 
This notion of the acceptability of taking money from religious activities is truer 
.r----
in the case of those ulama who prioritise religious education. They believe that 
religious education is part of the struggle in God's path (jihad.ft sabilillah). They 
spend their own money or families' wealth to build schools and struggle to find 
financial sources to maintain them. Similarly, those pengajian tuan guru, 
although they do not have financial burdens as much as those heads of pesantren, 
would spend their time to come to different places to give religious sermons. 
Certainly, one can understand even appreciate their taking money from such 
activities. That is important for the sustainability of a long-term religious 
39 Interview with Guru Nanang Gayam, Banjar District, 9 June, 2008 
40 As reported in 'Iskandar-Hafiz Paling Rajin Kampanye, Sjachriel-Aidi Paling 'Malas' 
Kampanye', Radar Banjarmasin, 28 June 2005 
41 Guru Bakeri claimed that he returned the honorarium, arguing that Sjachriel himself needed the 
money more than he did to finance the campaign. Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Gambut, 
Banjar District, 24 May 2008. 
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education. 
Finally, as ulama are symbols of religion, they believe it is important for them to 
be strong financially to show the strength of religious messages they spread. For 
ulama, being rich is therefore, a necessity. A tuan guru's remark substantially ( captures this point: "Would the followers believe that an u/ama 's prayers were \ 
being heard if they were poor? !"42 All these points are to show that an ulama 's 
taking of the money for themselves is not necessarily wrong or bad. 
I 
L-j 
Rewards for institutions 
One good example of rewards for a tuan guru's institution was the donation made 
by Sjachriel to help build a new musalla (a prayer house but also a centre of 
activities) in Guru Bakeri's pesantren. The donation was larger than that which 
Sjachriel and other candidates made to other pesantren or houses of worship. As 
mentioned in chapter three, Sjachriel gave over 25 million rupiah for the 
construction of the new musalla. This took place close to pilkada time and it did 
not seem to be intended to attract Guru Bakeri' s sympathy. Guru Bakeri had 
alrea~y agreed to support Sjachriel in .the pilkada before t¥e don.ation was made. 
Thus 1t was more a reward for a committed supporter. \____ ~'-' ~ (-z, LM~ _ku..:.. 
Another kind of donation served as a means to win the support of those who 
might have not made up their minds about the preferred candidates. 43 Examples 
of this nature were the donations of Sjachriel and of Golkar' s candidates to Guru 
Bakhiet's Nurul Muhibbin, or of Rudy and Rosehan to the Islamic kindergarten in 
Guru Nanang Gayam's neighborhood. Guru Bakhiet told me that Sjachriel and 
Iskandar donated five million rupiah each, and Guru Nanang informed me that 
Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan donated 2.5 million rupiah each. 44 The donations were 
not intended as rewards, as the recipient communities made no commitment to 
vote for them. The money was an example of the gains that could accrue through 
42 Interview with Guru Alunad Bakeri, Gambut, Banjar District, 24 May 2008. 
43 Most of the time, a supporting tuan guru would stick to their choice if they had made one 
regardless of offerings from other candidates. 
44 Interview with Guru Muhammad Bakhiet, Barabai, 31 May 2008; with Guru Nanang Gayam, 




a willingness to open the door for politicians. 
Pesantren Darussalam of Martapura is a good example of a pesantren which 
benefited because one of its leaders supported the winning candidates, Rudy and 
Rosehan. Guru Khalilurrahman, in addition to being a PKB leader, was second in 
charge of Darussalam in 2005. After the 2R team won the pilkada, the pesantren 
got easy approval for funding proposals submitted to the governor and deputy 
governor's offices. 45 This, perhaps, was also because Rudy Ariffin had a prior 
relationship with the pesantren 's leaders before he assumed the governorship. He 
used to be a district head (bupati) in Martapura, the city where Darussalam is 
situated. 
The South Kalimantan Nahdlatul Ulama also benefited from the victory of the 
Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan team. NU was quietly involved in the pilkada 
campaign and many individual NU tuan guru and officials 1 joined the 2R 
campaign team.46 For the organization, Rudy, as the governor, approved a 
monthly subsidy amounting to five million rupiah47 or five times the size of the 
subsidy given to NU by the previous governor. 48 Getting money from the 
government to finance the organization is one of the reasons why it is so difficult 
for NU to give up partisan politics. 49 NU tuan guru, moreover, were treated 
favourably by the winning candidates. Every year Rudy and Rosehan would pay 
for their trips to the haul events in East and Central Java, including the uang saku 
45 He did not specifically mention what the proposals were about. But, judging from the usual 
grounds for proposal submitted by the pesantren community in South Kalimantan, they would be 
for annual celebrations of Islamic festivities such as Mau/id Nabi or lsra Mi 'raj. 
46 The then chairman of South Kalimantan NU, Rusydiansyah Asnawi, indeed supported the 2R 
team by confidentially issuing a support letter on behalf of NU and campaigning for them. The 
letter became public two years after the 2005 pilkada following the dynamics of a Bupatipilkada 
in 2007. See 'NU Dukung Fakhruddin, diberikan lewat surat resmi', Radar Banjarmasin, 11 
January 2007 and 'Surat NU di-PBNU-kan, Perseteruan Syaifullah-Syatbaini Meruncing', Radar 
Banjarmasin, 19 January 2007. For the support from individual NU tuan guru, see 'Rudy Ariffin 
Didukung Personal NU', Radar Banjarmasin, 9 June 2005; 'Petinggi NU Turon Gunung', 
Banjarmasin Post, 2 June 2005. 
47 Interview with Guru Supian, the serving rais syuriah, Banjarmasin, 13 May 2008. 
48 As stated by Rusydiansyah Asnawie, the former executive chairman of South Kalimantan NU 
in 'Rudy Ariffin Dapat Dukungan Personal NU', Kalimantan Post, 9 June 2005 
49 Eunsook Jung, "Giving up partisan politics? Indonesia's biggest Muslim organizations are 
having second thoughts about partisan politics'', Inside Indonesia, no. 94, October-December 
2008, 
http://insideindonesia.org/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id= 114 7 &ltemid=4 7 
(accessed 9 November 2008) 
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(money for food and incidentals during the trip). 50 To my knowledge, previous 
governors did not provide this kind of free service for a group of tuan guru, 
although a future one may imitate it. 
Bonuses 
As noted above, only the winning candidates gave bonuses; the defeated had 
obviously no incentive to do so. Many of tuan guru supporters of Rudy and 
Rosehan did not lead pesantren. They were preachers, some more popular than 
others, who routinely gave Islamic sermons in their areas. Unsurprisingly, the 
nature of the rewards given to them was individualistic. 
Habib Ali Haidar received a car from Rudy Ariffin, a gift given only to him and 
Guru Bahran Jamil. 51 Then, in 2007, Habib Ali was appointed a deputy in the 
Rudy-led PPP, with a newly created portfolio to handle, namely youth and 
religion. 52 Rusydiansyah Asnawie, then the executive chairman of South 
Kalimantan NU, was appointed deputy as well, at the same time. 
Furthermore, Habib Ali became a close associate of Rudy. Two instances make 
this point apparent. First, Habib Ali told me that Guru Bakt:~ri once offered him a 
position on the Mesjid Sabilal Muhtadin managing board ~,11\}s ~tt€rnpt, in Habib 
Ali's opinion, to keep his own position there after the defeat of Sjachriel, Guru 
Bakeri's patron. Habib Ali politely rejected this offer but promised to talk with 
Rudy about the future of Guru Bakeri in Mesjid Sabilal. 53 If this story is true, it 
indicates that Guru Bakeri considered Habib Ali a close associate of Rudy. 
Second, Rudy agreed to join the routine pilgrimage to the tomb of Guru Zaini 
Sekumpul organised by Habib Ali Haidar with a group of spirited youth. 54 Guru 
Zaini' s tomb in Martapura is usually visited every second month as part of Habib 
50 Interview with Habib Ali Haidar, Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008. 
51 Interview with Guru Hamdan Khalid, Amuntai, 3 June 2008 and Alunad Syazali, Banjarmasin, 
3 May 2008. 
52 According to Habib Ali, this portfolio does not exist within the structure of the PPP in other 
provinces. This implies that the portfolio was created to accommodate his entrance to the South 
Kalimantan PPP structure. Interview with Habib Ali Haidar, Battjarmasin, 17 May 2008. 
53 Interview with Habib Ali, 17 May 2008 
54 Interview with Habib Ali, 17 May 2008. 
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Ali's program to visit holy sites around the province. While Rudy can certainly 
choose to do this pilgrimage whenever he wants, he decided to join Habib Ali's 
group. This is another sign of the good relationship between them. 
Guru Supian was given a free hajj pilgrimage in 2006. He was sent as a regional 
supervisor for hajj pilgrims whose expenses were paid by the regional 
government. 55 The authority to appoint the provincial supervisors rests with the 
governor and his deputy. 56 In addition, Supian's son was an awardee of the travel 
grant to Yemen, a program initiated by Habib Ali and applied by the Rudy 
administration. The grant, as received by Guru Supian, amounted to a generous 
twenty eight million rupiah57 and was given by the provincial government to 
seven students. 58 
The other two tuan guru supporters of 2R, Guru Khalilurrahman and Guru 
Hamdan Khalid received nothing notable, so far as I could discover. They would 
however, highly likely be invited to join the haul trips as they are prominent NU 
tuan guru. 
The individualistic nature of the rewards reflects an acknowledgment on the part 
of the candidates that they feel indebted to tuan guru personally . It may also 
indicate their attempt to entertain tuan guru for the purposes of future elections. 
Tuan guru will have vested interests in continuing to support those 'kind and 
generous' politicians. This was the case with Guru Bakeri, for instance. However, 
there is room to believe that the politicians do respect ulama, and the special 
treatment of them is simply a reflection of the social status of ulama. There were 
55 Interview with Guru Supian, Banjarmasin, 13 May 2008 
56 H. Anwar Hadimi, the director of hajj affairs at the South Kalimantan department of religious 
affairs, 11 May 2008. Every year, regional heads, namely gubernur and bupatis, appoint some 
prominent tuan guru to supervise pilgrims of their respective regions. These pilgrims ' supervisors 
are called Tim Pembimbing Haji Daerah (the team for supeivising regional pilgrims, TPHD) and 
the regional governments, at the province or kabupaten levels, pay the trip expenses and some 
amount of money as salary. The TPHD is not the only group that provides supervision, because 
the ministry of religious affairs in every province also establishes its own supervising team. The 
difference is that the authority of selecting who go as TPHD lies exclusively on the hand of' /:""if) 
regional heads, i.e. Governor and bupatis, while those who use the ministry of religious affa1rS' 
channel have to compete, sometimes openly, with other applicants. The TPHD becomes a ~ . · 
of politicians to cultivate good relationship with ulama, and in this case as a means of rewarding 
supporters. 
57 Interview with Guru Supian, Banjarmasin, 13 May 2008 
58 Interview with Habib Ali, Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008. 
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a couple of tuan gurz(who reportedly supported other candidates, but were 
invited by Rudy and R6sehan to join the haul trips, for example. 59 
Th i.Rdi-¥i~ti-c-nature of the rewards also means that he community hardly) 
enjoys any benefit fro . them. The trips to haul events to Java or free p'tgri-ma-ge 
could not be sha . Similarly, the car and the position in a party were possessed 
by the tuan guru ver, outcomes of the rewards such as the experiences 
gained during the trips and t se of positions and facilities could benefit the 
community of tuan guru. Tuan guru ed to make that the case if they want to 
hold on to the respect and allegiance of the1 followers. 
I have discussed the campaign activities of tuan gu and the gains generated out 
of their involvement in the pilkada. I have argued tha tuan guru calculated their 
steps in showing support for the candidates. This means that they chose the type 
of campaign functions they wanted to attend, i.e. open o closed campaign, and 
how frequent they could participate. I have suggested that an guru based their 
calculations on reasons such as the disapproval of some Mus ·ms to the political 
participation of ulama, tuan guru's individual ambitions and t eir views on how 
politics should serve their interests. 
Furthermore, tuan guru were rewarded for their participation in . ampaign both as 
individuals and as the leaders of particular institutions. I have ointed out that 
tuan guru received honoraria intended for them as individuai s. I also have 
illustrated that the organizations or institution~lr~ l~ad also got 
facilitations or donations from the candidates!' As such, the in~ ~ii) the 
pilkada generally serves tuan guru's interfsts and benefited ,their institutions. 
Therefore, the picture of ulama as acting e~· ely out of self-interest does not 
match with the experience of the tuan guru. 




Where Interpenetration Was Met by Contingency. 
The 2005 gubernatorial pilkada in South Kalimantan presented the interpenetration of 
Islam and politics. The gubernatorial candidates felt it necessary to demonstrate their 
Islamic credentials before the electorate and to show their closeness to ulama. On the 
other hand, ulama opened their doors for the candidates and were willing to 
participate in their campaigns. It was common, then, to see politicians in pengajian 
and ulama in the campaign. Campaign functions often had religious sermons in the 
program list. Conversely, regular pengajian often contained messages to vote for 
particular candidates. Outside the campaign period, an intensified in.terpenetration of 
Islam and politics such as this would be very rare to witness. For instance, pengajian 
generally focus on religious themes with almost no political content, and politicians 
rarely attend them unless they are religiously enthusiastic. The interpenetration of 
Islam and politics does not vanish completely between elections, as South 
Kalimantan is an overwhelmingly Muslim province, but it occurs to a much lesser 
degree. 
In this study, I have examined the role of Islam and the tuan guru who were involved 
in the pilkada. I also have asked how this political event in South Kalimantan 
compares with the general trend in local elections elsewhere in Indonesia. 
The pilkada shows a more complex picture than what political observers have painted 
regarding local elections in Indonesia. A dearth of ideological preferences and the 
domination of pragmatic considerations (McGibbon 2006 and Baswedan 2007) 1 
were only one side of the story in South Kalimantan. The gubernatorial pilkada did 
1 Rodd Mc Gibbon, 'Indonesian Politics in 2006: stability, compromise and contest over ideology' , 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, No. 42, vol. 3, 2006, p. 331 and Anies Baswedan, 
'Indonesian Politics in 2007: the presidency, local elections and the future of democracy' , Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, No. 43, vol. 3, p. 339 
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witness two coalitions of nominating parties that followed the 'pragmatic and non-
ideological' trend identified by McGibbon and Baswedan. These were the coalition 
of the nationalist PDI-P and the Islamic PBR (Partai Bintang Reformasi) that 
nominated Sjachriel Darham and Noor Aidi, and the coalition of 13 parties across 
ideologies (nationalist, Islamic and Christian) with no seat in the local parliament that 
provided the nomination ticket for Ramlan and Baderani. In addition, some 
candidates such as Sjachriel Darham, Ismet Ahmad and Baderani approached both 
Islamic and nationalist parties before settling with their eventual nominating parties. 
In those cases, as long as a party or a coalition of parties was able to secure the 
nomination, the ideological preference of each party did not matter. The pilkada, 
however, also saw coalitions of Islamic parties that associated with largely 
traditionalist Islam such as PPP and PKB which supported Rudy Ariffin and 
Rosehan, and parties associated with modernist Muslim like PAN and PKS which 
nominated Ismet Ahmad and Habib Aboe Bakar al-Habsyi. The evidence shows an 
old-fashioned coalition built between parties with a close ideological preference. The 
last two pairs of candidates finished respectively as the victor and in the second 
place. 
Both pragmatic and idealistic considerations can also be found in the motivations of 
tuan gu.ru to support the gubernatorial candidates. As demonstrated in chapter three, 
service exchange was the driving motivation in many cases. Tuan gu.ru felt it 
necessary to support gubernatorial candidates because the latter donated or provided 
facilities for their institutions. Some tuan guru did campaign with an expectation of 
getting future rewards. This is not uncommon at all. Writing on NU kiai, Martin van 
Bruinessen notes that they expected politicians 'to provide them and their business 
partners with facilities, access to decision-makers ... ' in exchange for their follower's 
votes. 2 However, my examination of other tuan gu.ru suggests that their political 
support arose . from something intangible, such as political ideals and party 
2 In Martin van Bruinessen and Farid Wajidi, Syu'un Ijtima 'iyah: Traditionalist Islam, civil society 
and social concerns, p. 6. Retrieved from 
http://www.let.uu.nl/~rnmtin. vanbruinessen/personal/publications/Bruinessen Wajidi Traditionalist I 





































membership. The first reason, political ideals, accounts for tuan guru who supported 
candidates who did not give their institutions a cent while other candidates came to 
them with millions of rupiah. The second reason, party membership, was apparent in 
the case of some tuan guru who refused to support a candidate, who provided them 
free health insurance, because of their affiliation with a party which nominated other 
candidates. Thus, while important, pragmatic considerations did not motivate all tuan 
guru to support particular candidates. 
Another concern of this study has been the role of tuan guru and Islamic sentiments 
in the pilkada. Tuan guru played a limited political role in the pilkada compared to 
other ulama in numerous regions in Indonesia. They acted as campaigners in 
campaign events, newspaper columns and, sometimes, regular pengajian. They 
promoted the candidates and gave justifications as to why the voters should elect 
them. Furthermore, their presence strengthened the 'Islamic aura' in the political 
theatre that already featured candidates with Islamic credentials. This was part of the 
candidates' strategies for appealing to the voters who respected tuan guru as teachers 
or informal leaders. However, tuan guru neither controlled the process of political 
nomination like their Madurese counterparts in Sampang, 3 nor did they run as 
candidates as ulama did in Nusa Tenggara Barat and East Java. Indeed, the pilkada 
did not facilitate a drastic change in the role of tuan guru as local leaders . 
It is hard to know whether the voters chose particular candidates because they 
followed their tuan guru or for other reasons. The fact that all candidates sought 
support from tuan guru suggests that tuan guru are still important. Indeed, in three 
out of five districts that I visited, the candidates supported by particular tuan guru 
won in the places where those tuan guru live. 4 On the other hand, the candidates also 
3 See Abdul Gaffar Karim, 'Pesantren in Power: religious institutions and political recruitment in 
Sumenep Madura', Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, vol. 42, no. 1 (2008), pp. 157-184 
4 Interview with Guru Muhammad Bakhiet, Barabai, Barabai, 31 May 2008. Statistical evidence from 
three districts, Banjar, Banjarmasin and Hulu Sungai Tengah, shows a similar pattern. However, the 
places in question are also the residence of the candidates or the bases of the nominating parties. Thus, 
it is difficult to attribute the domination of particular candidates in the places only to the influence of 










































applied other strategies, including financial inducement by distributing money 
directly to the voters 5 or television sets to local village heads 6, and by financing 
small infrastructure construction projects, such as complex roads (jalan di kompleks), 
mosques and schools. 7 Apparently, they realised that support from tuan guru per se 
would not be enough to attract the voters, especially when every team had a tuan 
guru . 
This was part of a broader picture oflslam's role in the pilkada. This study finds that 
Islam was not the determining factor in the pilkada results exactly because all 
candidates made use of it. The role of Islam was in fact contingent on a number of 
other factors notwithstanding its prominence in the campaign. This conclusion goes 
in concert with the limitation of Islam in Indonesian politics as argued by Greg Fealy 
(2003). Fealy concluded that 'Islam has seldom acted as an independent, cohesive or 
determining force in Indonesian politics'. 8 Thus the trend in n'ational politics is 
mirrored at the local level. 
My argument, as presented in chapter two, about this contingency challenges the 
general view of the local observers who argued that Islam was the key to explaining 
the pilkada. I also believe in the crucial role of Islam in the pilkada, as the voters 
would vote out any non-Muslim candidate for instance. However, I suggest that a 
multi-causal relationship that interconnects Islam and factors such as a clean public 
image, enough time to campaign and sufficient political funds, and effective 
campaign teams work better in explaining the pilkada results. The local observers, for 
instance, failed to explain why the incumbent Sjachriel Darham performed poorly 
Sungai Tengah, Laporan Penghitungan Suara Pemilihan Gubemur dan Wakil Gubernur Provinsi 
Kalimantan Selatan Tahun 2005 . 
5 Banjarmasin Post, Tim Sukses AdukanMoney Politics, 3 July 2005; Kalimantan Post, Iskandar 
Asuransikan 3.500 Anggota BPK (Badan Pemadam Kebakaran), 8 Juni 2005. 'Money Politics di 
Kandangan Tertangkap Tangan', Kalimantan Post, 30 Juni 2005 
6 Marcus Mietzner, Local Elections Briefing: South Kalimantan, 2005, unpublished, p. 3 
7 Banjarmasin Post, Ketika Kandidat Rame-rame Beri Sumbangan, Siapa Yang lebih Gede, Ya Dipilih, 
11June2005 
8 Greg Fealy, 'Divided Majority: The Limits oflndonesian Political Islam', in Shahram Akbarzadeh 
and Abdullah Saeed (eds), Islam and Political Legitimacy, RoutledgeCurzon, London and New York, 


































despite his generous donations to some pesantren and the support he received from 
the popular Guru Ahmad Bakeri. By applying a multi-causal relationship analysis, 
this failure can be overcome: I have demonstrated that Islam worked better for the 
candidates who were seen to have clean reputations, which Ismet Ahmad and Habib 
Aboe Bakar possessed, and which Sjachriel did not. Here, Islamic appeals in fact 
were a boomerang for unpopular candidates who had a history of corruption 
allegations because such images are not Islamic. Islamic teachings condemn public 
officials who steal from the state or misuse their power to enrich themselves beyond 
the confines of law. With regard to the multi-causal analysis, I also suggest that the 
victors, Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan, possessed the combination of all the factors 
previously mentioned . 
The contingency of the role of Islam also indicates that religious sentiment as a 
motivation for to vote now has 'competitors'. The pilkada results ~eflect this: Islam 
was not the sole consideration. Back in the 1950s and 1960s when ideological and 
religious divisions were prominent, religious sentiment contributed significantly to 
the support secured by Islamic parties. In 2005, the gubernatorial candidates offered 
financial inducement and promises of real change, not simply Islamic appeals. As a 
result, voters had several factors, apart from Islamic sentiment, to consider before 
making their votes . 
In the 2005 gubernatorial pilkada, the interpenetration of Islam and politics was met 
by the contingency of Islam on other factors in determining the outcome of the 
political race. The pilkada showed the incorporation of Islamic sentiments and 
Islamic leaders (tuan guru) as part of the campaign strategy of all candidates. It also 
revealed that Islam by itself was not enough to achieve electoral victory. The pilkada 
also indicated that the use of appeals to Islamic sentiments could damage those 
whose character and behaviour contradicted religious teachings. In addition, tuan 
guru were, by and large, supporters and campaigners in the pilkada. The pilkada did 
not expand their political role beyond the realm of the campaign. Tuan guru barely 






















gubernatorial pilkada. Finally, the trend in local elections towards the triumph of 
pragmatic considerations was mirrored only partially in the pilkada. Ideological 
promiscuity was not the only language of the day, as idealistic reasoning and 
ideological preferences still made their presence felt. 





















a. Tuan guru 
Nanang Gayam (pseudonym), Banjar District, 30 April and 9 June 2008 
S upian, the Rais Syuriah of South Kalimantan NU, Banjarmasin, 13 May 2008 
Habib Ali Haidar al-Kaff, a young ulama, Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008 
Khalilurrahman, the former chairman of Dewan Syura of South Kalimantan PKB, 
Martapura, 19 May 2008 
Abdurrahman, the head of Pesantren Al-Falah, Banjarbaru, 21 and 22 May 2008 
Ahmad Bakeri, the head of Pesantren al-Mursyidul Amin, Gambut, 24 May 2008 
Dimyati, a senior teacher in Pesantren lbnul Amin Pamangkih, Barabai, 29 and 30 May 
I 
2008 
Mukhtar Salman, the head of Pesantren Ibnul Amin Pemangkih, Barabai, 30 May 2008 
Muhammad Bakhiet, the head ofNurul Muhibbin, Barabai, 31May2008 
Hamdan Khalid, the fomer Rais Syuriah of the South Kalimantan NU, Amuntai, 3 June 
2008 
b. Politicians 
Rosehan NB, the deputy Governor of South Kalimantan, Banjarmasin, 2 May 2008 
Ibnu Sina, a PKS provincial parliamentarian, Banjarmasin, 6 May 2008 
Husni Nurin, a PKB provincial parliamentarian, Banjarmasin, 8 May 2008 
Gusti Jazuli, a PKB Banjar district parliamentarian, Martapura, 20 May 2008 
H. Faqih Jurjani, a PKS Hulu Sungai Tengah district parliamentarian, Barabai, 29 May 
2008 
Tajuddin, a PPP Hulu Sungai Tengah district parliamentarian, Barabai, 30 May 2008 
Ilyas, a former PPP Hulu Sungai Utara district parliamentarian, Amuntai, 2 June 2008 
c. Confidential 








Barabai, 30 May 2008 
Banjar district, 9 June 2008 
d. Others 
Ahmad Syazali, a senior lecturer at IAIN Antasari Banjarmasin, a researcher at LK3 
Banjarmasin, Banjarmasin, 2 and 3 May 2008 
Hasanuddin, the coordinator of the People's Voter Education Network (JPPR) in South 
Kalimantan, Banjarmasin, 2 May 2008 
Jamhuri, a member ofRosehan campaign team, Banjarmasin, 3 May 2008 
Norhalis Majid, the former chairman of Banjarmasin KPUD, Banjarmasin, 7 and 11 May 
2008 
H. Anwar Hadimi, the director of hajj affairs at the South Kalimantan department of 
religious affairs, 11 May 2008. 
Radin Muhjad, the former Panwas Pilkada of South Kalimantan, Banjarmasin, 14 May 
2008 
Arridla, a local journalist, Banjarmasin, 14 May 2008 
Saifuddin (pseudonym), a villager living nearby of Pesantren al-Mursyidul Amin, 
Gambut, 24 May 2008 
Fakhriadi, a Junior teacher at the Pesantren al-Mursyidul Amin, Gambut, 24 May 2008 
Haris Fadilah, an administrator at Nurul Muhibbien, Barabai, 31 May 2008 
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